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Abstract
Region 5 is one of the most impoverished and insecure regions of Ethiopia. For
decades, the region has suffered from a multitude of armed conflicts involving state and
non-state actors. Region 5 is also one of the most underserved states of Ethiopia with
some of the lowest levels of human development indicators nationwide. Although the
adversities of poverty and conflict are widely acknowledged in their own respect, there
has been little or no inquest into why poverty and conflict have prevailed under the same
space for decades. Poverty and conflict have often been seen as separate phenomena that
are dealt with using different sets of theories and practices in the real world. Nonetheless,
a closer look at poverty and conflict in Region 5 reveals that both are strongly connected
to each other. The poverty-conflict trap has been an on-going cycle in the region for the
last five decades. The main intent of this research paper is analyzing the two-way
relationship between poverty and conflict in Region 5. By studying this relationship, this
analysis seeks to contribute to a new framework that brings peacebuilding and
development closer.
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1. Poverty and Conflict: A Self-Perpetuating Cycle in the Somali Regional State
(Region 5), Ethiopia: 1960-2010
The Somali Regional State or Region 5 is one of the poorest and least developed
regions with some of the lowest levels of human development indicators nationwide.
The inhabitants of the region posses limited or no access to social, economic, and
political resources needed for a decent standard of living. Region 5 is also one of the
most conflict-prone and unstable regions of Ethiopia with a long history of violent
conflicts. Various conflicts ranging from communal disputes to rebel insurgencies
characterize the region, not to mention the regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa.
Although the adversities of poverty and conflict are widely acknowledged in their own
respects, there has been little or no inquest into why poverty and conflict have prevailed
together for decades. This is because poverty and conflict have often been seen as
separate phenomena that are dealt with using different sets of theories and practices in
the real world. Nonetheless, a closer look at poverty and conflict in Region 5 reveals that
both are strongly connected in a reciprocal relationship. The poverty-conflict trap has
been an on-going cycle in the region for the last five decades.
Although scholars are far from a consensus on the primary causes of armed
conflicts, several studies show the fact that civil wars erupt in countries suffering from
poverty and economic decline. How poverty triggers conflict is, however, another line of
contention between political economists and social psychologists. This divide is usually
played out along the greed-grievance debate. The greed rebellion theory presents a
simple rational choice model where the rebel’s aspiration for self-enrichment and
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growth serves as the primary motive of civil wars in developing countries. On the other
hand, the grievance model argues that the social discontent arising from the relative
deprivation of social groups is a potent source of civil wars in the developing world.
Poverty is one of the prime causes of armed conflicts in Region 5. The relative
deprivation of the region’s inhabitants that results from their unequal share of social,
economic, and political resources nationally is a strong source of social discontent.
However, their perception of deprivation contextualizes not from an absolute standard,
but through a comparison of their socio-economic position with the actual and perceived
circumstances of other social groups in Ethiopia. This is especially important because
they perceive their deprivation and unequal socio-economic status coinciding with their
collective identity. The grievance resulting from such systematic inequalities has been
used by political entrepreneurs and rebel movements to mobilize civilians for collective
violence.
On the other side of the conflict-poverty cycle, armed conflict has directly and
indirectly contributed to the region’s poverty status. In the last five decades, conflict has
destroyed and reduced the human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of the
region. The inhabitants have suffered from death, physical and psychological injuries,
forced migration, trade blockade, restriction on mobility, killing and confiscation of
livestock, and famine as a result of armed conflict. These damages were not only the
unintended outcome of warfare, but also part of the government’s deliberate
counterinsurgency strategy that targeted civilians and their economic base. These factors
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have greatly affected the welfare of the people and pushed the majority of Region 5 into
poverty.
Poverty and conflict are often seen as independent phenomena with little or no
impact on one another. On the contrary, this practice of isolating conflict and poverty
has long ignored their double causation and cyclical relationship within the context of
Region 5. The main goal of this research paper is analyzing this two-way relationship
between poverty and conflict in Region 5. The study employs various theories in social
psychology, conflict resolution, development studies, and economics in examining the
causes and effects of poverty and conflict in Region 5 within the last five decades.
The structure for the rest of the paper is as follows. The second chapter of this
paper will cover the geographic and demographic background of Ethiopia and Region 5.
It also includes information on the geography and modern history of the Horn of Africa.
The third chapter focuses on the dynamics of armed conflicts in the region. One of the
unique characteristics of armed conflicts in Region 5 is that they occur within complex
regional dynamic connecting local, national, and international factors. The armed
conflicts in the region are highly connected with each other and therefore require a wider
and comprehensive approach in analyzing them. The fourth chapter is concerned with
clarifying the two research variables, poverty and conflict. Both are multidimensional
concepts that shift their meanings in time. It is therefore crucial to have a clear
understanding of these two variables before analyzing their two-way connection.
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The fifth chapter contains a review of literature on some of the critical areas of the study.
The sixth chapter analyzes the different theories that have been used to establish a
relationship from poverty to conflict. It highlights the greed versus grievance debate that
has remained a major line of difference between political economists and social
psychologists on linking poverty to conflict. The chapter deals on how these theories
apply to the reality in Region 5. This section also lays out the conceptual framework that
leads from conflict to poverty. It identifies the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA)
for assessing the socio-economic impact of armed conflicts and documents on how this
concept practically applies to the situation in Region 5. Chapter seven wraps up this
research paper.
Research Purpose
Although there is a growing amount of literature on poverty and conflict in
Ethiopia, the two conditions have often been treated as separate branches of academic
inquiry. Poverty has traditionally been a concern of development studies and economics
while conflict has been the preserve of conflict and peace studies (Goodhand, 2001).
However, the challenges of the twenty-first century have revealed the intertwining
characteristics of poverty and violence. According to Stewart (2000), the post-Cold War
era has witnessed the complex and interlinked challenges of poverty and conflict. Any
strategy to tackle poverty must also work to transform conflicts while poverty alleviation
programs and development strategies can’t afford to neglect issues related to conflict.
The overall aim of this research will be helping create a comprehensive and
multidisciplinary approach to conflict resolution that simultaneously addresses the
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sources of violence and poverty. Understanding the two-way relationship between
poverty and conflict would help to develop a new framework that brings peacebuilding
and development closer.
Research Hypothesis
The research paper assumes that there is a two-way causal relationship between
poverty and conflict within the context of Region 5, Ethiopia.
1.

When deprivation and inequality coincide with the social identities of people,

they can be a strong source of collective grievance which can translate into violence.
2.

Armed conflict can lead to poverty by destroying and diminishing the human,

physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of households and diverting national
resources from development to military activities.
Limitations of the study
There are two limitations that need to be acknowledged in this research. The first
limitation concerns the multidisciplinary aspect of this study. For a long period of time,
poverty and conflict have been subject matters covered by multiple disciplines. Any
study that tries to establish a relationship between these two complex variables requires
more experience and expertise around multiple fields of studies. The second limitation
refers to the time and resources allowed for conducting the research. Although the study
area only covers a single region of Ethiopia, the nature of the two-way relationship
between poverty and conflict is a complex subject matter that would have been better
approached with more time and resources.
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2. Background Information
Ethiopia: Geographic and Demographic Background
Located in the Eastern part of Africa, present day Ethiopia is a land-locked state
bordered by Eritrea in the north, Sudan in the west and southwest, Somalia in the east
and southeast, Kenya in the south, and Djibouti in the east ( Figure 1). It covers a total
area of 472,000 square miles, which is close to twice the size the of France. Ethiopia has
an estimated population of 85 million (2008 estimate), the second most populous
country in Africa. Christianity and Islam get about equal share with each claiming
around 45 percent of the total population (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2010).
According to Gutu (2008), Ethiopia is home to about eighty ethnic groups that vary in
population size from a thousand to about 18 million. The 1994 National Census Survey
listed seventy languages spoken as mother tongues by different ethnic groups in Ethiopia
(Central Statistics Agency [CSA], 1995).
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Figure 1: Map of Africa and Ethiopia
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Region 5: Geographic and Demographic Background
Commonly referred to as Region 5, the Somali Regional State is one of nine
federal regions of Ethiopia. It is located in the southeastern part of the country
bordering Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The region also shares borders with other
Ethiopian regional states namely, Oromia (Region 4) and Afar (Region 2). Although
Region 5 is part of the Ethiopian administration, it maintains strong historical, cultural,
and economic ties with neighboring Somalia. The region is often referred to as
“Ogaden”, named after its majority Somali clan, the "Ogadeni” (Lewis, 2004).
Region 5 obtained its current shape in 1994 after Ethiopia adopted an ethnic
based federal state system to reflect the distribution of the various ethnic groups found
within its territory (Figure 2). Ethnic identity was employed to draw the boundaries
between administrative regions. Thus, the land inhabited by ethnic Somalis became the
“Somali Regional State” or Region 5. Similarly, territories populated by other major
ethnic groups like the “Oromos”, “Amharas”, and “Tigres” became Oromia Regional
State (Region 4), Amhara Regional State (Region 3), and Tigray Regional State
(Region 1) respectively (Alemayehu, 2004).
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Region 5 covers a total area of 105,000 square miles with a population of 3.9
million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2008). According to CSA (1999), ninetysix percent of the population is of Somali descent. The inhabitants are commonly
referred to as “Ethiopian-Somalis” to distinguish them from ethnic Somalis living in
mainland Somalia.1 Although the two groups occupy the opposite sides of an
international border, Ethiopian-Somalis in Region 5 and Somalis living in Somalia have
the same ethnic origin, culture, and history. Most of the major clan-families found
within Somalia including “Darood”, “Hawiye”, “Dir”, “Issa”, “Rahaweyn”, and ethnic
“Bantus” are also present in Region 5 with varying proportions (Eno, 2008).
Region 5: Climate and Livelihood
With temperatures reaching over one hundred degrees Fahrenheit and annual
rainfall averaging between 12-19 Inches per year, Region 5 falls under arid and semiarid agro-ecological and climatic zones (Gebre-Mariam, 2005). The way of life in the
region is a reflection of the coping strategies adopted by its inhabitants to meet the
challenges of a harsh and fragile ecosystem. The livelihoods of most Ethiopian-Somalis
primarily revolve around animal husbandry. They are mainly nomadic pastoralists and
agro-pastoralists engaged in livestock production or a mix of livestock and crop
production. The nomadic way of life serves as an adaptive strategy to the complex

1

The Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 by a merger of two former colonial
territories, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The country remained intact until
1991 when the central government collapsed amidst an on-going civil war.
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environmental vulnerability of the region. Sedentary agriculture is practiced to a lesser
extent within river valleys (Baroud, 2003).
The Horn of Africa: Geographic Background
The Horn of Africa is a tusk shaped geographical region found in the
Northeastern corner of Africa (Figure 3). Its name comes from a geopolitical term that
was coined during the Cold War in reference to Somalia and Ethiopia. Through time, the
usage has expanded to include the neighboring countries of Eritrea, Djibouti, and parts
of Sudan (Lunn, 2008) and covers 741,316 square miles (Kalib, 2007). Since the mid1990s, the term, “Greater Horn of Africa”2 is applied to add Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, and Tanzania to the list. By all forms of designation, Region 5 forms an
important sub-region of the Horn of Africa. Although it is part of the Ethiopian domain,
Region 5 represents a crossroad territory that has been shaped by socio-political and
historic developments in the Horn of Africa.

2

This term has been widely used since the U.S foreign policy proposal, “The Greater
Horn of Africa Initiative” kicked off in 1994. For more information, refer to
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/ghai/
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Figure 3: The Horn of Africa
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The Horn of Africa: Historical Background
Throughout its history, the Horn of Africa has been an important geo-political
region for its long stretch of shoreline along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. For
centuries, the region has attracted numerous foreign powers that wanted to secure their
maritime trade routes. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic value of
the region became even more prominent among countries involved in international trade.
It brought competing European powers like Britain, France, and Italy onto the scene.
Egypt and Ethiopia were also two African powers that played significant roles in the
region’s political process. It was, however, the British who took the first step to
safeguard the Red Sea route. Britain established a garrison in Aden, Yemen in 1839. At
the time, Britain was prepared to deter any power from obtaining posts along the African
coastline. Intense competition came from France, which secured a foothold at the Port of
Obock in present-day Djibouti in 1862. Britain reacted by establishing protectorates in
parts of what is today Somaliland (Northern Somalia) and Region 5. The Italians
followed by expanding along the Eritrean coastline in 1885 and later setting up their
protectorate in Southern Somalia (Henze, 2000).
Ethiopia not only survived the “Scramble for Africa”3 but at the same time
expanded its frontiers to areas never before reached. By combining diplomatic and

3

The Scramble for Africa (1880-1900) was the rapid colonization and partition of the
African continent among European imperial powers. It was driven by the economic,
social, and political changes that took place in Europe during the second half of the
nineteenth century. Ethiopia was the only African nation to maintain its independence
during the “scramble for Africa” by utilizing its military and diplomatic powers.
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military tactics, Ethiopia laid claims and conquered Somali-inhabited areas of the Horn,
most of which are parts of today’s Region 5 (Zewdie, 2001). In 1897, Ethiopia also
negotiated an important border treaty with Britain that ceded land in Region 5 (Ogaden
and the Haud areas). According to Lewis (2004), 1897 remains a crucial year for the
history of the Horn; the partition of the Somali inhabited territory of the Horn of Africa
was complete, and Somalis were divided between five geographical units. These were
British-Somaliland, Italy-Somaliland, French-Somaliland (later Djibouti), Ogaden
(Region 5), and the Northern Front District in British-East Africa (later Kenya).
Ethiopia entered the twentieth century as an independent and sovereign state.
But, it was only a matter of time before it was conquered by Italy in 1935. In 1940, Italy
entered the Second World War and joined the Axis Alliance with Germany and Japan. It
soon declared war on Great Britain and annexed British Somaliland in the Horn of
Africa. The Italians then adjoined Eritrea, Ethiopia, British Somaliland, and Italy
Somaliland to establish the “Africa Orientale Italiana-AOI” or the Italian East African
Empire (See Figure 4).
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The empire was however short-lived as British and the Commonwealth forces drove out
the Italians not only from British Somaliland but also from the entire Italian East African
Empire in 1941 (Mohamud-Abdi, 2007). Italy’s defeat temporarily brought most of the
Somali-speaking territories in the Horn of Africa under the British Military
Administration (BMA). In 1954, Britain restored Region 5 to Ethiopia based on the
Border Agreement of 1897. In 1960, British Somaliland and Italy Somaliland merged to
form the Republic of Somalia (Lewis, 1994).
One of the impacts of colonialism during the twentieth century was the growth of
national consciousness among Somalis living in the Horn of Africa. The emergence of
groups like the Somali Youth Coalition (SYC) and Somali Youth League ( SYL) in the
1940s and 1950s became prototypes of Somali nationalism. These movements called
not only for independence from foreign occupation but also unity among Somali
communities found in different parts of the Horn of Africa (Barnes, 2007). For these
nationalists, the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Border Agreement and the 1954 territorial
concession of Region 5 to Ethiopia partitioned the ethnic homeland of the Somali nation.
As will be seen in later sections, these two events are linked with the various domestic
and international conflicts that erupted in Region 5 during the second half of twentieth
century.
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3. The Dynamics of Armed Conflict in Region 5 (1960-2010)
Region 5 has historically been a contentious region of the world with multiple
forms of violent conflicts. Healy (2008) argues that barely a single decade can be
identified in the last one hundred years when Ethiopia and Somalia did not experience
armed conflict.4 These conflicts have occurred at various levels ranging from local
clashes to conventional warfare involving states and non-state actors. McGinnis (1999)
points out that these multi-level conflicts often overlap with one another, creating a
complex conflict trend in the region. The past and present conflicts of the region are part
of a more broad and complex framework linking local, regional, and international
factors.
The underlying causes of conflict in the region are complex. Various factors
have been identified as root causes of conflict by commentators and policy makers.
These include clan politics, ethnicity, religion, ideology, environmental insecurity,
struggle for productive resources, viability and legitimacy of failed and emergent states,
and outside intervention (Creative Associates International [CAI], 2008). Although these
variables remain important components of the regional conflict complex, one has to also
understand the unique setting under which these variables intract to generate multifacetted conflicts.

4

Ethiopia (Region 5) and Somalia cover a greater portion of the Horn of Africa.
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Armed Conflicts in Region 5
Region 5 represents a crossroad territory that has been heavily influenced by
events in both Ethiopia and Somalia. According to Hagmann (2007), the region has for a
long time been a buffer zone where Ethiopian and Somali, global, and local forces clash
with one another. For the last five decades, it has staged numerous organized conflicts in
the form of domestic insurgencies, interstate conflicts, and transnational conflicts.
Although the fault line between these conflicts often remains elusive, violence maintains
a systemic presence in the region.
In recent years, Region 5 has been known for its frequent humanitarian crisis in
context of an on-going civil war and regional instability. The primary armed group
currently fighting the Ethiopian government is the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF), a separatist rebel movement founded in 1984. The ONLF (2009) describes
itself as a vanguard organization leading the “struggle of the people of Ogaden”
(Region 5) in a quest for self-determination.5 Although the civil conflict has been going
on for years through intermittent hostilities, it gained a dramatic momentum in the year
2007 after the ONLF enhanced its attacks against the Ethiopian government.6 This was
followed by a massive and brutal counterinsurgency mission by government forces that

5

Region 5 is traditionally referred as “Ogaden”, named after its majority clan,
“Ogadeen”.
6
In April 2007, the ONLF attacked a Chinese-run oil field in Abole, Region 5 killing
more than sixty-five Ethiopian and nine Chinese oil workers. The Ethiopian government
responded by launching a brutal counterinsurgency campaign (HRW, 2008a).
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has exacerbated the humanitarian situation in the region (Human Rights Watch [HRW],
2008a).
It should be noted that the forerunner to today’s ONLF was the Narsulla uprising
or the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF).7 The movement was born in 1963 under close
aid from Somalia’s newly independent government (Mohamud Abdi, 2007). Somalia
was formed in 1960 through a merger of the British protectorate of Somaliland and the
Italian colonies of Northeastern and South Somalia. In the aftermath of its independence,
the new government was determined to incorporate all Somali speaking population of
East Africa under a single Pan-Somali state.8 For Somali nationalists, independence was
an important first step towards creating a Somali nation-state that would ultimately
encompass Somalis in Ethiopia (Region 5), French-Somaliland (Djibouti), and northern
Kenya (Lunn, 2008). One of the strategies adopted for achieving this was to support
dissident movements in Ethiopia's Region 5 and other neighboring countries of the
Horn.
In 1963, Somalia’s military support for the OLF rose to the point where it drew a
countermove from the Ethiopian side. This spilled into a brief conventional war between

7

The Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) should not be confused with the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF), a rebel insurgency founded in 1973 and fighting for the freedom
of Oromia Regional State (Region 4) from Ethiopia’s rule.
8
The nationalist scheme was enshrined in the constitution and symbolically represented
in the new flag which featured a five pointed star-each star point representing the five
territories claimed by the Somali nation; British Somaliland, Italy Somaliland, Northern
Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, French Somaliland (Djibouti), and Region 5 (Ogaden)
in Ethiopia.
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Somalia and Ethiopia until a ceasefire was brokered in 1964 (Deng & Zartman, 1991).
After a decade of withdrawal, Somalia continued its support to the rebels by helping
recreate the OLF under a new name, Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). In 1976,
WSLF intensified its military activities in Region 5. A year later, Somalia aligned its
national army alongside WSLF forces once again transforming the intrastate conflict
into an interstate rivalry. Somalia’s direct military involvement started in July 1977, and
helped bring most of Region 5 under its control. It also marked the onset of the Cold
War in the Horn of Africa (Haileselassie, 1981).
The Effects of the Cold War
The Cold War divided much of the world into two spheres of ideological
influences, one mandated from Washington and the other from Moscow. Throughout the
course of the Cold War, the superpowers were never directly engaged in armed conflict
in their own territories. Instead, the vast majority of wars fought during these days were
fought in territories of the periphery, the developing world where basic human needs
were rarely or barely satisfied (Lederach, 1997). The 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war was a
Cold War era conflict that took place in one of the poorest regions of the world. It also
added a new layer onto the already complex conflict dynamics of the region. Until the
mid-1970s, Somalia and Ethiopia were the military beneficiaries of the Soviet Union
and United States respectively. However, Ethiopia’s ideological shift towards the East
bloc and Somalia’s demarche to the West changed the reality. The shift of alliance was
to Ethiopia’s advantage as the country benefited from massive shipment of Soviet
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armaments and Cuban military personnel. This quickly changed the balance of forces on
the ground. By March 1978, Ethiopia was able to push back Somali and WSLF forces
and recovered all of Region 5 (Keller, 1998).
The Cold War significantly altered the conflict dynamics of Region 5. Following
Ethiopia’s victory, the WSLF’s operation in Region 5 began to weaken. According to
Lockyer (2006), by 1980, the WSLF fell in “frequency, size, and sophistication to a
level that no longer made it a genuine threat to the Ethiopian regime” (p.3). In 1984, a
splinter group of the WSLF, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) emerged by
promoting Ogaden’s (Region 5) independence as opposed to Pan-Somalism. This was a
political shift from an ethnic (Somali) to a clan-based (Ogadeni) movement. As stated in
the beginning of this section, ONLF is still an active insurgency group in Region 5.
The Cold War also carried long-term political consequences for the Horn of
Africa. The impacts were more devastating for Somalia as it set the stage for years of
civil violence and disorder. According to Ahmed & Green (1999), the Ethio-Somali
conflict has been interpreted by some as the single most important turning point for
Somalia. It sowed the seed of future internal conflicts, prompting the rise of several
Somali rebel movements to overthrow the regime. However, by beginning of
1990s, none of these competing factions were strong enough to assume central power
(Moller, 2009). The political fragmentation left Somalia without a functioning
government since 1991.
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The Changing Aspects of Organized Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Period
The nature of organized conflicts has evolved in the Post-Modern period as many
have become conflicts without borders involving both state and non-state actors. The
flourishing of insurgent groups that span international boundaries and the cross-border
intervention of states in adjacent civil wars mark the two important characteristics of
organized conflicts in the post-Cold War period (McGinnis, 1999).
According to Lindbergh & Melvin (2007), Islamist militant groups are regarded
as “archetypal transnational organizations” because their mode of operation often
transcends state boundaries and challenges the conventional approach to state security
(n.p.). One such coalition that formed in the early nineties in Somalia was Al-IttihadIslamiyya. The group began asserting its presence in Ethio-Somali border areas in the
early1990s. It sought to liberate Region 5 from Ethiopia’s rule, but unlike past resistance
movements, it also wanted to establish an Islamic political order in the Horn of Africa
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 2005). Al-Ittihad-Islamiyya was supported by Islamic
charities in the Gulf States and had a military wing that largely consisted of veterans
returning from Afghanistan’s Mujahidin forces in late 1980s and early 90s
(Bryden,2005).
The recent Ethiopian invasion of Somalia also marks another changing feature of
organized conflicts in the region. In December of 2006, Ethiopian troops crossed into
Somalia to help the weak Somali interim government oust the Islamic militia group,
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The Transitional Federal Government (TGF) of Somalia
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was formed in 2004 in Kenya under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development in East Africa [IGAD] (Lunn, 2008). Despite its recognition by some
international bodies like the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), the
government lacked any meaningful control of Somalia. Its main challenge came from
the UIC which started to control major areas of the country beginning in 2006.
According to Cliffe (1999), the majority of modern day conflicts in the Horn of
Africa have always been amplified by a pattern of mutual state interventions by
neighboring states. Although this has been a common trend of organized conflicts in the
past, the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was a big change in the region’s conflict
dynamics. Kalib (2007) adds, “In all the wars that the countries of the region have
fought against each other, never before has the army of one side enter the capital city of
another and engage in urban warfare” (n.p.).
The real motive behind Ethiopia's invasion can be approached from different
angles. First, the UIC has lent some support to Ethiopia's main insurgent groups
including the ONLF. In addition to this, Ethiopia believed that its northern neighbor
Eritrea, having fought a two year war9 with Ethiopia (1998-2000) was engaged in a
proxy war by helping ONLF and UIC inside Somalia. Ethiopia is also a key partner of
the U.S War on Terror as part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA). The United States has repeatedly insisted on a link between UIC and Al-Qaeda

9

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a two year (1998-2000) war over a disputed border.
Although direct fight has ceased through international intervention, the boundary
conflict remains unsolved.
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and that there is the potential of Somalia being used as a staging ground for international
terrorism. The U.S. hence tacitly supported Ethiopia’s invasion in material and logistic
terms (Slavin, 2007). Unfortunately, the military intervention which ended in 2008 has
resulted in greater insecurity in the Horn of Africa and one of worst humanitarian crises
in Somalia.
Summary
Region 5 represents an interface zone which has been greatly shaped by
historical events in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Throughout its modern history, the
region has been a theatre for organized conflicts that played out in various local,
national, and international wars fought among state and non-state actors. These conflicts
are interlocked with one another with a blurred line of distinction. What started as a
local rebellion by OLF in 1963 was also a closely supported mission by neighboring
Somalia from its very beginning. At the time, Somalia was a new state formed from a
merger of former British and Italian colonies. Upon its independence, Somalia was
embarked on a mission to unite all Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa, one
of them being Region 5. However, Somalia’s intervention shifted the local rebellion into
an interstate conflict. As a result, two conventional wars were fought between Somalia
and Ethiopia in 1963 and 1976. The second Ethio-Somali War (1976-78) became part of
the Cold War as the superpowers were drawn into it. It was a large scale conflict with
long-term impacts for both Somalia and Ethiopia. The effect was stronger on Somalia’s
side as it led to the collapse of the central government in 1991. Somalia’s statelessness
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in turn brought security challenges for Ethiopia as the former became a host for local
insurgencies and some transnational militant groups. This challenge comes on top of the
growing local insurgency that is mounted by the ONLF, a predecessor of the OLF.
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4. Defining the Research Variables: Poverty and Armed Conflict
Although poverty and conflict are different phenomena that plague many
societies, the effect of one on the other has recently become the subject of much research
(Draman, 2003). The main objective of this research paper is to analyze the two way
association between poverty and armed conflict in Region 5. However, the povertyconflict nexus is a complex subject that goes beyond the direct, cause-effect relationship.
Both armed conflict and poverty are multidimensional concepts with no universally set
meanings. They are defined through changing parameters in space and time. It is
therefore imperative to have a clear understanding of these two variables before
analyzing their two-way connection. The aim is not to create a new perspective but to
build a framework that goes beyond the conventional meanings of both poverty and
armed conflict.
Poverty
Poverty is perhaps one of the most complex concepts from which to derive a
universal definition. In the past five decades, various terms have been used to describe
poverty namely, income poverty, human underdevelopment, social exclusion, ill-being,
lack of capability and functioning, vulnerability, livelihood unsustainablility, lack of
basic needs, and relative deprivation (Maxwell, 1999). Despite this richness in
vocabulary, there still lacks a coherent functional framework to define poverty. This is
due to the multidimensional aspect of poverty which can only be captured by employing
different indicators.
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Objective Aspects of Poverty
Globally, poverty is estimated along a uniform reference poverty line expressed
in common unit (income). For the purpose of global aggregation and comparison, the
World Bank uses reference lines set at $1.25 and $2.00 (2005 Purchasing Power ParityPPP) to express “extreme poverty” and “poverty” respectively (World Bank, 2008). The
United Nations Development Fund [UNDP] (2007) has also developed another measure
- Human Development Index (HDI) to measure the level of human development in each
country. Its measurement employs a comprehensive index (HDI) which integrates three
dimensions of human security; household income, life expectancy, and adult literacy.10
By most objective measures, Ethiopia is one of least developed countries of the
world. According to a World Bank (2009) data, Ethiopia was 197th in a list of 210
countries ranked by their Gross National Incomes (GNI- PPP) for the year 2008. The
UNDP (2007) also ranked Ethiopia at 169th place out of 177 countries measured by their
2005 HDI. The same report found that 77.5 percent of Ethiopians fall below the income
poverty line of $2 /day while 39 percent of the population were in extreme poverty,
earning less than a dollar a day.
Subjective Aspects of Poverty
Poverty is a matter of deprivation, but the way people perceive and respond to it
varies in space and time. As Barash and Webel (2004) posited, one of the most
10

For more details on HDI and how it is calculated, refer to:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/
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important, if least recognized, aspects of poverty is its psychological dimension which
shapes our perception of deprivation and inequality. Although poverty can be measured
objectively using widely accepted indices, it remains crucial to assess it from a social
angle. Often, individuals and groups measure their social and economic well-being
without the absolute economic standards like income and food consumption. They
measure their well-being by relating their socio-economic status with other individuals
or groups. This refers to the subjective analysis of one’s well-being according to the
expectations or standards set by a given society. It is this subjective view of poverty that
is crucial when studying its relationship with violence. This is because it is not just the
condition of being without adequate food or shelter that automatically translates to
violence but the social consciousness surrounding this deprivation.11
Armed Conflict
Conflict studies literature of the Cold War era defined armed conflict on the
basis of selective parameters. According to Brozoska (2007), the traditional conception
of armed conflict focused on areas of government involvement, political objective, and
military casualty at its core. In contrast, post-Cold War conflicts in Region 5 and in
many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have often been outside of this realm. Armed
violence is common in disputes involving state and non-state actors with or without a
political motive and, in most cases, civilians are the main causalities.

11

Goodland (2001) states that the absolute measures of poverty are less significant than
the poor people’s expectations and sense of grievance.
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The pattern of conflicts in the post-Cold War period has changed the general
meaning of armed violence. The increasing number of non-state actors12 involved, the
deliberate killing of civilians, and the sophisticated method of arms financing have all
called into question the validity of the traditional concept of armed conflict. According
to Oyebade (1998), one of the implications of the fall of the Cold War is that it has
created a new perspective from which to view conflicts and their resolution. To this end,
one of the most widely used data-source on global armed conflicts, the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP), has revised its definition of armed conflict by adding “non-state
conflicts” and “one-sided violence” to its global database of armed conflicts.13 Non-state
conflict involves the use of armed forces between two organized groups, neither of
which is the government of a state, resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths
in a year. One-sided violence refers the use of armed force by the government of a state
or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least twenty-five
deaths in a year (UCDP, 2010).
Another conflict analysis tool, the Conflict Barometer, was developed in 1993 by
the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. It captures some of the

12

13

private armies, communal groups, and terrorist groups

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) collects information on armed violence
that occurred after 1946. Data on armed conflicts have been published yearly in the
report series, States in Armed Conflict since 1987, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988,
the Journal of Peace Research since 1993, and in the Human Security Reports since
2005. Starting 2004, the UCDP also operates and continuously updates its online
database on armed conflicts and organized violence. The UCDP data is a widely used on
global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how
conflicts are systematically defined and studied (UCDP, 2010).
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changing natures of collective violence in the post-Modern period.This model focuses
on the intensity levels of violence, separating conflict into two major categories: nonviolent and violent. Non-violent conflict consists of latent and manifest conflicts while
violent conflicts scale from crisis to severe crisis, and war (Conflict Barometer 2008,
2008) (See table 1).
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Table 1
Conflict Intensities
State of Intensity
Violence Group

Level of
intensity

Name of
intensity

Definition

1

Latent
Conflict

A positional difference over
definable values of national meaning
is considered to be a latent conflict if
demands are articulated by one of the
parties and perceived by the other as
such.

2

Manifest A manifest conflict includes
Conflict measures that are preliminary to the
use of violent force. This includes
verbal pressure, threatening explicitly
with violence, or the imposition of
economic sanctions.

3

Crisis

A crisis is a tense situation in which
at least one of the parties uses violent
force in sporadic incidents.

4

Severe
Crisis

A conflict is considered to be a
severe crisis if violent force is used
repeatedly in an organized way.

5

War

A war is a violent conflict in which
violent force is used with certain
continuity in an organized and
systematic way. The conflict parties
exercise extensive measures and the
extent of destruction is massive and
of long duration.

Low

NonViolent

Medium
Violent

High

Note. From Conflict Barometer: 17th Annual Conflict Analysis 2008 (p.1), Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research, 2008 by Heideberg University.
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Organized and Communal Conflicts
For the greater part of its modern history, the Horn of Africa has staged
numerous violent conflicts that set states against states and communities against
communities (Wasara, 2002). Considering the reality in Region 5, armed conflicts have
occurred under all three categories of violent conflicts (crisis, severe crisis, and war) in
the last five decades. For the purpose of this study, violent conflicts can be categorized
based on the organizational structure of the conflicting parties. We can classify armed
conflict along two lines: organized conflict and communal conflict.14 Organized conflict
involves conflicts that are carried out by structured groups that have a combat unit under
a single military command. This is mostly carried out by the state or rebel insurgencies
with specific political objectives. On the other hand, communal conflict refers to
sporadic incidents of violence taking place between or within communities. It refers to
violence that erupts at the community level without the use of a specially assigned and
trained unit for warfare. One example of this can be inter-clan or intra-clan conflict that
takes place without the involvement of other organized groups. This study follows
UCDP’s (2010) definition of armed conflict and focuses only on organized conflicts.15

15

An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year in one of the
conflict’s dyads. A dyad is made up of two armed and opposing actors. In state-based
conflicts a dyad is defined as two actors, with one or more being the government, that
have a stated incompatibility. In a non-state conflict, a dyad is constructed by at least
two organized actors, of which none is the government of a state, that oppose each other
with arms (UCDP, 2010).
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Summary
Both Poverty and conflict are dynamic concepts with meanings that shift over
time. “What is poverty?” or “what constitutes an armed conflict?” are questions that find
different answers with time. For any study that is analyzing the cyclical relationship
between these two variables, it is important to frame them within the context of the
study region. This research paper conceptualized poverty from bottom-up; that is, from
the subjective experience of people. The social perception of poverty goes beyond the
economic well-being of people and captures hidden dimensions of poverty. The other
research variable, armed conflict is placed under a new framework that addresses the
changing nature of violence in the Post-Modern world. It was divided into two groups
(organized conflicts and communal conflicts) based on the organization structure of the
conflicting parties in Region 5.
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5. Literature Review
In the post-Cold War era, more and more studies are pointing the fact that
poverty and conflict have a two-way causal relationship. This portion of the study will
examine the literature that explores the relationship between poverty and conflict and
that advocates the significance of studying such relationships. The following sections
will review four critical areas of this study: (1) The vicious cycle between poverty and
conflict 2) The impact of poverty at the onset of conflict 3) The effect of conflict at the
onset of poverty, and 4) The closing gap between peace and development.
The Vicious Cycle between Poverty and Conflict
There is growing international literature on the relationship between poverty and
conflict that studies the changing nature of armed conflicts and the extent to which
poverty can be regarded as both a cause and an effect of conflict. Peace and conflict
researchers increasingly recognize that poverty, underdevelopment, and high levels of
inequality are all high risk factors for armed conflict. On the other side of this
relationship, armed conflicts entail a range of economic and social damages that push
societies into poverty. These include the loss of life, physical and intellectual
disabilities, mass displacement of civilians, destruction of physical and economic
infrastructures, and diversion of expenditures from development projects to the military
sector (Hillyard, Rolston, & Tomlinston, 2005).
According to John Prendergast, endemic poverty and wide inequalities of income
are often reliable predictors of conflict in Ethiopia’s Region 5. Poverty has severely
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limited opportunities in education, access to resources, and economic advancement in
the region. When poverty is combined with deep social and economic inequalities, the
struggle for scarce resources trigger violent conflicts in the region. The central role of
the state in determining the resource allocation between regions has made it a major
target of conflict in the last five decades (Lederach, 1997).
Region 5 is characterized by longstanding conflict between government forces
and local armed rebel groups. The region has long suffered from the effects of violent
conflict that has severely undermined the ability of the public sector to deliver basic
social services to most of its population. It has also led to the destruction of physical and
economic infrastructures causing widespread poverty in the region (Gele & Bjune,
2010).
Although the causal relationship between poverty and conflict is far from
simple, research has shown that poor countries are at a higher risk of experiencing
violent conflicts. At the same time, the excessive numbers of violent conflicts taking
place in Least Developed Countries (LDC) are the main sources of poverty. According
to the UN (2004), in the 1970s and 1980s, over forty percent of countries affected by
civil conflicts were LDCs. The proportion increased to fifty percent during the period
1990-95 and fifty-eight percent in 1996-2001 (UN, 2004).
While there is no automatic linkage between poverty and conflict, an
accumulating body of evidence suggests that their relationship runs in both directions.
Violent conflict reinforces poverty by disrupting societies and rolling back human
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development gains built up over generations. Similarly, poverty is part of the cycle that
creates and perpetuates violent conflicts in LDCs. Poverty and violent conflict
systematically reinforce each other and for many societies, the conflict trap is part of the
poverty trap (UNDP, 2005).
Copson (1991) uses a similar argument in highlighting the two-way linkage
between poverty and conflict in Africa. The author points out the continuing prospect for
violent conflict outbreaks in countries affected by poverty, social cleavage, and
repressive government policies. Copson also underscores the difficulty to foresee
economic or social development across Africa until the burden of violent conflicts ends.
The poverty-conflict hypothesis is still a new area of study that is attracting
research from disciplines like social psychology, conflict resolution, political economics,
and development studies. Despite a general consensus on the direct and indirect impacts
of conflict on poverty, there still remains a disagreement on the primary conflict
triggering effects of poverty. Kanbur (2007) states that the causality from conflict to
poverty is not much in doubt as violence destroys or impairs incentives for development.
In contrast, the precise nature of causality in the other direction, from poverty to conflict
is more ambiguous and subject to a greater debate.
The Impact of Poverty on the Onset of Conflict
For years, a debate has raged in academic circles over the principal sources of
conflict. While there still remain some disagreements about the causes of conflict, many
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studies show that the overwhelming majority of civil wars erupt in countries suffering
from persistent poverty or sharp economic decline (Rice, Graff, & Lewis, 2006).
According to Catholic Relief Services [CRS] (2010), seventy-three percent of
the poorest billion people in the world have lived through a violent conflict or are
embroiled in conflict now. Poverty breeds hopelessness and frustration among people
and makes them, especially the young and unemployed, more vulnerable to calls for
violence.
According to Lederach (1997), the majority of armed conflicts take place on the
margins of societies that are struggling with poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment.
They also occur in territories where basic necessities such as housing, health, and
education are rarely or barely satisfied. The Horn of Africa represents one of these
regions where the lack of basic human needs faced by certain segments of society serves
as a predisposing factor for armed conflicts (Lederach, 1997).
While violent conflict is not confined to the global south, a disproportionate
share of armed conflicts take place in poor countries. More than half of the countries in
Africa are affected by at least one form of armed conflict. These conflicts are not
temporary emergencies and have systemic and enduring features. The chronically poor
increasingly live in contexts of chronic insecurity (Goodhand, 2001).
In the last two decades, poverty and conflict have become the biggest challenges
to sustainable development around the world. Poverty plays an important role in
triggering and sustaining armed conflicts, and it is often cited as one of the principal
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factors responsible for instability in many parts of Africa. In 2002, thirty-eight of the
sixty-four low-income countries around the world were associated with armed conflict:
all of them were Sub-Saharan African countries (Draaman, 2003).
A large majority of the poor across the globe is affected by widespread violence
and conflict. Many studies of civil war point to low per capita income as a strong factor
in the outbreak of conflict. The role of economic factors in the outbreak and duration of
civil wars has attracted the attention of many scholars from various disciplines. Some of
these studies have drawn attention to the relationship between conflict and poverty.
They highlight the significant role played by factors like resource predation and social
grievances on the onset and duration of civil conflict (Justino, 2008).
Although poverty is an increasingly acknowledged causal factor of conflict,
recent studies on civil wars are split on the actual process leading from poverty to
conflict. According to Ballentine and Nitzschke (2006), the greater part of the academic
debate has become polarized around the greed versus grievance dichotomy, juxtaposing
“loot-seeking” with “justice-seeking” rebellions, and, more generally, the significance of
economic versus socio-political drivers of civil war (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2006, p.2).
The two contrasting perspectives, greed and grievance, have been utilized to
explain the onset of civil wars in the developing world. While the greed theory mainly
receives support from economists, the grievance proposition is famous among experts of
social psychology, development studies, and conflict resolution. According to Murshed
and Tadjoeddi (2007), the greed rebellion theory is an economic explanation of civil war
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which argues that domestic conflicts stem from the self serving motive of rebel groups
whose major goal is to illegally capture natural resources like oil, diamonds, and timber.
Some of the actions suggested for ending such conflicts include limiting the incomegenerating means of rebels. The other argument, the grievance model, states that relative
deprivation and the grievance it produces is the main source of conflict. People mobilize
against their governments in response to current or anticipated deprivation. The social,
economic, and political marginalization of people results in mass frustration which can
translate into violence. One of the solutions suggested for ending such conflicts is to
address the inequality line between social groups (Murshed &Tadjoeddi, 2007).
Greed Rebellion Theory
The greed theory has been an influential body of knowledge used by various
international analysts and policy makers on the onset of civil conflicts in developing
countries. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that greed is the main driving force behind
most domestic conflicts. Their argument rests on the notion that poor countries with
slow economic growth and a high proportion of primary commodity exports in their
GDP face higher risks of conflict. A sluggish economic growth translates into the lack of
employment opportunities, thus making recruitment to rebel forces much easier. On the
other hand, a high proportion of primary commodity exports in the GDP indicate the
availability of plunderable resources which rebels can capture to fund their warfare
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2001).
The greed rebellion theory finds its root in the Rational Choice Theory (RCT)
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which is based on the assumption that human beings are rational and calculate the likely
costs and benefits of any action. Malesevic (2004) points out that the RCT views the
human nature as intrinsically selfish, greedy, and largely unchangeable. It assumes that
individuals are motivated by self-interest in a world of permanent competition over
limited resources, power, and status, and as rational individuals, they choose an
alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction. Although the theory has
long been a dominant paradigm in economics, it has recently gained prominence in
various disciplines including political science and sociology (Malesevic, 2004).
The greed theory reflects on the economic rationality of leaders and followers,
which find war to be more profitable than peace. Its proposition is drawn from post-Cold
War civil conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa where armed struggle for controlling natural
resources served as an incentive for profit-seeking groups to engage in violent behavior.
Hence, the abundance of non-renewable natural resources in poor societies, which is
labeled as a “resource curse” by proponents of this model, is seen as an important factor
in igniting civil wars (Stewart, 2008).
Several rebel movements in Africa have been implicated with the plundering of
natural resources through illegal taxation and cross-border smuggling. For instance,
illicit diamonds (conflict diamonds) have been used by rebels to fund the civil wars in
Angola, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
According to Lichbach (1995), a rebel organization has the ultimate duty of acquiring
resources to secure the inflow of new fighters and to keep its current membership intact.
These tasks critically depend on the rebel’s ability to offer rewards or payments to its
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new and old members. This also explains a rebel group’s aspiration of grasping material
wealth through illegal means.
The attempt to benefit materially from war, through looting or other forms of
violent accumulation, is hardly a new phenomenon. Economic considerations often
shape the calculations and behavior of the parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular
war economy and a distinctive dynamic of conflict. Even where military and political
objectives appear to provide the obvious rationale for fighting, conflicts are still likely to
be influenced by economic motives and opportunities, especially at the local level
(Berdal & Malone, 2000).
Keen (1998) argues that scholars have long regarded conflict as simply, a
breakdown in a particular system, rather than the emergence of a new, alternative system
of profit and power. The persistence of civil war in developing nations cannot be
explained without acknowledging the fact that internal conflict can be profitable, both
for elites and for ordinary people involved. Hence, for significant groups both at the top
and at the bottom of society, violence can be an opportunity for self-enrichment rather
than a problem.
Proponents of the greed rebellion theory strongly dismiss the notion that
grievance is a motivating factor of civil wars. Collier (2000) argues that conflicts are far
more likely caused by economic agendas than by grievance. Collier says, “the true cause
of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed”
(p.92). Although the rationale behind rebel organizations is essentially greed, the actual

Poverty and Conflict

42

discourse played may be entirely dominated by grievance. This is done in order to
maintain a good public image and attract new recruits. Collier also rejects the view that
inequality or relative deprivation is connected to civil conflicts. Collier argues that
“inequality, whether measured in terms of income or landownership, has no effect on the
risk of conflict...this is, of course, surprising given the attention inequality has received
as an explanation of conflict” (p.97).
Grievance Rebellion Theory
The argument of the greed rebellion theory is refuted by the grievance model
which uses a different causal connection between poverty and conflict. Ostby (2004)
argues that greed based studies of civil war argue that relative deprivation and grievance
have no connection with the outbreak of civil conflicts. Ostby stresses the fact that the
vast majority of these studies tend to concentrate exclusively on economic inequality,
thus failing to capture the multidimensional nature of inequality. Given the fact that the
human population is different in many respects, it is important to remember that
inequality can be much more than just income inequality. The greed theory also uses an
individualistic approach to inequality by focusing on inequality among individuals even
though what it is trying to study is group conflict. This may explain why so many greed
theorists have failed to find a relationship between relative deprivation and conflict
(Ostby, 2004).
The grievance rebellion theory argues that relative deprivation and the social
grievance it produces is the major source of armed conflict. Under the grievance
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hypothesis, the dynamics linking poverty to conflict rest on two important steps in the
conception of poverty. The first is the shift from the traditional, income based approach
of poverty to a broader view which also includes social, cultural, and political
dimensions. A single focus on the economic attribute of poverty fails to capture the
multidimensional aspects of human well-being. The second shift refers to the swing
from an absolute view of poverty expressed in standard economic terms to a form of
poverty defined by values prevalent in a given society. This marks the move to relative
poverty which focuses on how individuals perceive their relative position in society. A
group’s access to social, economic, and political resources can be influenced by the
relative position of its members in society. Often, the social position of individuals is
part of a serious imbalance of opportunities that limit certain members of society from
accessing various types of resources. The unequal status or the relative deprivation of
some individuals and groups is an ultimate source of grievance which can translate into
collective violence (Verstegen, 2001).
Despite its multidimensional characteristics, poverty implies a diminished or
deprived access to economic, social, or cultural resources that are needed to satisfy basic
needs. The exposure of the poor to such socio-economic conditions that stem from the
unequal share of material and non-material resources can give rise to a distinctive
pattern of collective behavior. Human needs theorists like Richard Burton have
characterized such collective behavior that emerges from the denial of basic needs as
social frustration and aggression. The failure to satisfy basic needs, according to Burton
(1987), is a sufficient explanation of social dissidence and deviant behaviors as well as
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of political and social instabilities. Deep rooted social conflict springs from deprived
human needs.
The denial of material and non-material needs have been known to cause
frustration, prompting a possible reaction in the form of aggressive behavior. If we were
to strictly apply the frustration-aggression theory, Opotow (2000) argues that all social
frustrations from unmet needs can result in collective violence. However, frustrationaggression is not a direct cause and effect relationship, and frustration doesn’t always
result in violence. Likewise, not all violence is the result of frustration. To this end,
Opotow employs Leonard Berkowithz's argument which points out that the effect of
frustration on aggression is also mediated by the perception of one’s status in a larger
system or relative to others (p.409-410).
Pruit (2006) states that the basic source of conflict lies in unmet needs that are
either opposed by other party’s needs or simply deprived by another party. In spite of
that, need deprivation is not always a sufficient cause of conflict. Often, groups can
endure need deprivation for many years without resorting to violence. Two bodies of
theories have been developed to explain how need deprivation produces conflict: these
are relative deprivation theory and group mobilization theory (Pruit, 2006).
Relative deprivation occurs when social groups subjectively perceive themselves
as unfairly disadvantaged over other groups perceived as having similar attributes and
deserving similar rewards (their reference groups). Relative deprivation is the outcome
of a social comparison process whereby one group compares its socio-economic status
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with other similar groups. The discontent arising from relative deprivation has been used
to explain radical politics, social movements, industrial disputes, and the whole plethora
of crime and deviance (Young, 1999).
The concept of relative deprivation has been extensively used in social
psychology, sociology, and other social sciences for more than six decades. The concept
was first articulated by Stouffer and his colleagues in their wartime study, “The
American Soldier” (1949), which found out that people evaluate their social or
economic position not according to absolute standards but on the basis of their position
relative to others around them. Although the concept of relative deprivation has been
overshadowed for a long time, the post-Cold War period has seen its resurgence and its
integration into theories of collective behavior. The concept of relative deprivation has
since then acquired an important role in understanding the source of collective violence
(Walker & Smith, 2002).
Relative deprivation arises from differential access to various types of resourcessocial, economic, political, or cultural. Hence, it refers to inequalities among individuals
or groups across one or more dimensions. Social psychologists further break the concept
of relative deprivation into egoistic deprivation and fraternal deprivation. Egoistic
deprivation is the feeling that one individual is deprived relative to another while
fraternal deprivation is the feeling that one's group is deprived relative to another group
(Draman, 2003).
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According to the group mobilization theory, there are three stages on the way to
group action. First, individuals must strongly identify with a collective or group which
forms an important part of their self definition. Second, there should be a perception of
group deprivation, and the acceptance that the individual’s deprivation is part of a larger
pattern of deprivation victimizing the whole group. The third stage is group organization
where members assume the roles of leaders and followers and pool their actions for a
common purpose (Pruit, 2006).
Based on the results from numerous case studies, Stewart (2002) discusses the
group aspect of relative deprivation by highlighting the systematic inequalities between
identity groups. Stewart identifies inequalities among groups that are also differentiated
in religion, ethnicity, region, or racial affiliations as horizontal inequalities. This is
different from the conventional approach to inequality (vertical inequality) which
measures disparity between individuals or households. Horizontal inequalities are
multidimensional with political, economic, and social elements. They are established
when the lines of inequalities coincide with cultural or regional boundaries. This can be
a source of social grievance on behalf of the deprived group. Here, cultural identities
like ethnicity and religion can become powerful mobilizing agents leading up to
collective violence. Disturbances arising from horizontal inequalities may take the form
of sporadic riots, as has occurred in various cities in the U.S. during the civil rights
movement or in civil wars, such as the Biafran and Eritrean succession wars or even
massacres, as witnessed in Burundi and Rwanda, and local and international terrorism
(Stewart, 2002).
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Horizontal inequalities refer to the group aspect of relative deprivation. Although
the term is a new addition to the pool of development studies literature, the concept has
long been applied by social psychologists studying group conflicts. Gurr (1991) argues
that inequalities and discrimination along lines of ethnic and regional cleavage are
potent sources of conflict in African societies. The denial of opportunity to reduce these
inequalities results in collective grievance. The greater the inequalities, the more likely
the disadvantaged groups are geared for collective action. This is particularly true if the
inequalities are reinforced by customary and legal barriers established by dominant
groups. Under such circumstances, communal identity provides an easy basis for
mobilization. Where identity remains strong, it is relatively easy for political leaders
evoking symbols of common ethnic or religious interests to propagate ideologies of
resistance and organize group members for violent action (Gurr, 1991).
According to Gurr (1970), the primary causal sequence in political violence is
first the development of discontent, second the politicization of the discontent, and
finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.
“Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating
condition for participants in collective violence” (Gurr, 1970, p. 13).
The perceptions of deprivation or disadvantage are usually based on inter-group
comparisons rather than the estimation of the in-group position alone. People can
compare their in-group with an advantaged out-group. During this process, members of
the disadvantaged group perceive discrimination on the level of group identity rather
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than on that of individual identity. Hence, social identity and feelings of relative
deprivation can reinforce one another. Members of a group with a more salient social
identity can compare their group with another group and perceive more relative
deprivation. On the other hand, relative deprivation impacts the salience of social
identity by increasing in-group solidarity (Korostelina, 2007).
Most contemporary civil wars in developing countries have ethnic dimension
with ethnic groups fighting against one another or struggling against regimes dominated
by other ethnic groups. According to Murshed and Gates (2003), social identity is a
strong mobilizing force by which groups organize in pursuit of collective ends. The
capacity of ethnicity to facilitate collective action is superior to most other organizing
forms except religion. However, ethnicity by itself can’t produce mass violence. It
requires a well defined grievance that can be framed through the identity group in
question. A shared sense of relative deprivation strengthens identification with the ingroup and provides a strong base for political mobilization. That is why horizontal
inequalities are so important in organizing groups for political violence. Political
entrepreneurs usually seize this opportunity of inter-group inequality to add symbolic
systems and mobilize groups for violence (Murshed & Gates, 2003).
In his recent study, Sen (2008) underlined the complex picture of the povertyviolence relationship. He argued that poverty and inequality are importantly linked to
violence and that relationship is contingent upon the social and cultural circumstances of
the conflict setting. He added that it is the synergy between poverty and cultural
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identities that increases the significance of group inequalities and may contribute to
violence.
Conflict resolution scholars have effectively applied the grievance rebellion
theory in analyzing various civil conflicts in Africa. Copson (1991) argues that the
second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) between the North and the South erupted as
Southerners became aware of their region’s relative impoverishment. This became a
source of collective grievance that mobilized Southerners (Black Africans) against the
Northerners (Arabs). The presence of socio-economic inequalities along the line of the
Arab/African identity was essential in bringing the two groups into conflict.
Rothschild (1997) also documented on the pattern of resource distribution and its
impact in Ethiopia during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974). During this
period, available developmental resources were used to promote growth only in selected
provinces of Ethiopia. Allocations for social services like health and education were
clustered in Shewa Province (Central Ethiopia) and the capital, Addis Ababa. This has
led to the social and economic exclusion of large segment of the population. Rothschild
adds, by the end of 1973, there were only eighty-five hospitals in the country, twentyfive of which were in Shewa province and Addis Ababa. The relative deprivation of the
hinterland was important in forming collective grievance against the government. This
neglect of the periphery helped to ferment the 1974 revolution which overthrew the
Emperor and intensified the regional insurgency movements (Rothchild, 1997).
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Horowitz (1985) states how colonial rule in Africa shaped group relations and
made ethnic identity a more important matter than it might otherwise have been.
Colonial rule entailed a differential recruitment of ethnic groups into new roles that set
new standards of group worth in many African societies. The differential distribution of
opportunities and resources between ethnic groups has led to an emergence of dual
groups labeled as “advanced” and “backward” groups. The disproportionate
representation of some ethnic groups in the modern social, economic, and political
sectors meant the deprivation of others. One of the important factors that have produced
an extraordinary amount of conflict in many African countries is the juxtaposition of
“backward” or deprived groups with “advanced” or privileged groups (Horowitz, 1985,
p.147).
The Impact of Conflict on the Onset of Poverty
If poverty leads to insecurity, it is also true that the destabilizing effects of
conflict constitute a major factor of poverty. Poverty is both a cause of conflict and a
consequence of it. Conflict imposes a substantial cost on a nation’s economy and on the
welfare of its citizens. It can result in as many as thirty percent more people living in
poverty (Brainard, Chellet, & LaFleur, 2007).
Armed conflict is one of the leading causes of human misery and destruction in
the world. Conflict claims the lives of combatants and civilians alike, often in greater
tolls for the latter category than the first. It leads to massive population displacements,
social break-down, capital flight, ecological damage, and loss of livelihood. During
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armed conflicts, public infrastructures like bridges, hospitals, and schools are often
targeted by militants. This greatly undermines a government’s capacity to provide basic
services to its citizens. Moreover, scarce resources are diverted from productive
activities to violence. According to Barash and Webel (2004), “there can be no question
that on balance, war is impoverishing. It is essentially a parasite, feeding off the
economic and social strength of societies, and like most parasites, it weakens the host”
(p.492).
The Horn of Africa is gravely affected by protracted armed conflicts that are
interconnected at the local, national, and international levels. Conflict and insecurity
severely constrain development efforts by destroying physical infrastructures, disrupting
trade and markets, and diverting human and financial resources away from productive
sectors. Conflict also imposes huge economic and social costs through human
displacement, violation of basic human rights, and the destruction of livelihoods. These
costs disproportionately affect poor and marginalized groups, including women and
children (Eteffa, 2005).
According to the Ogaden Relief and Development Organization [ORDO], one of
the impacts of the long civil war in Region 5 has been the extreme shortage of basic
social services. The implications of inadequate access to social services have in turn
strained the human capital development and the productive capacity of the region.
Region 5 has 1.3 million children without primary and intermediate schooling and
another 1.3 million adults without access to any form of adult education (ORDO, 2010).
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Conflict is commonly cited as an important cause of poverty. The effects of
conflict are often immediate and dramatic. On the other hand, the consequences also
accrue long after the fighting has stopped, usually as war over-hang effects. Depending
on the magnitude and duration of conflict, the impacts also manifest at a variety of levels
including national (macro-level), local (meso-level), and household (micro-level).
(United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2005).
The damaging impact of any armed conflict depends on its size (the area and the
population it covers), stage, duration, and strategies adopted during the course of the
fight. The negative outcomes of some organized conflicts can extend beyond the local
setting and cover a wider area. Large scale interstate and intrastate conflicts are known
to have significant socioeconomic impact that can be felt at the national level
(Green, 1994).
The most obvious way in which a civil war damages an economy is through the
destruction of human and physical resources. Another consequence of conflict is the
disruption of the regular social and economic activities in the conflict setting. Social
order and the rule of the law are often suspended during armed conflicts. The destruction
wrought by warfare and the erosion of institutions and organizations constitute
deterioration in the economic environment. Conflict also entails the diversion of
government spending from development enhancing activities to military buildup.
Moreover, the insecurity caused by armed conflict discourages domestic investments
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and push human, physical, and financial capitals outside of the conflict setting
(Collier, 1999).
The World Human Security Center points out that as of the beginning of the
1990s, the number and intensity of organized conflicts have decreased worldwide.
However, this is counter to the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa where most of the
world’s armed conflicts currently take place. At the turn of the twenty-first century,
more people were killed in wars in this region than in the rest of the world combined. It
has been suggested that armed conflict in the region is now the single most important
determinant of poverty (Schindler & Bruck, 2007).
Africa has been one of the fertile grounds for armed conflicts during the second
half of the twentieth century. These conflicts have been a major cause of human
suffering and underdevelopment in the continent. According to Copson (1994),
“measured in terms of death, refugees and displaced persons, and lost economic
opportunities, African war is one of the great calamities of our era” (p.97). The extent of
disaster caused by conflict may never be fully grasped, both for technical and emotional
reasons. In addition to its human impact, armed conflict has been responsible for
massive disruption of societies, their networks, and their institutions. Africa’s wars have
also caused serious economic consequences for the countries involved. The day to day
cost of running a war have in many instances crippled national economies, stalled
development projects, and deterred potential investments in conflict-afflicted countries.
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Armed conflict is also behind most of the famines that occurred in the continent during
the last five decades (Copson, 1994).
A research made by OXFAM and the International Action Network on Small
Arms [IANSA] (2007) points out that compared to peaceful nations, African countries in
conflict have, on average, 50 percent more infant deaths, 15 percent more
undernourished population, 20 percent more adult illiteracy, 2.5 times fewer doctors per
patient, and life expectancy reduced by five years.
The consequences of armed conflicts on the social and economic development of
nations have been well documented. In the last two decades, there has been a growing
body of empirical research focusing on the impacts of violent conflicts on poverty.
While these studies examine the effect of conflict on poverty from many angles, the
majority are macro-level economic analysis of conflict. According to Ibanez (2010), a
large strand of economic literature estimate the impact of civil conflict on economic
growth and social outcomes based on aggregate economic data. However, such data fall
short of identifying the mechanism and channels through which conflict impacts
economic activities and social conditions leading to poverty. Moreover, it is important to
go beyond aggregate data in designing policies that aim to mitigate the effects of conflict
and promote sustainable peace (Ibanez, 2010).
Although most researches on conflict are macro-level studies, there is a growing
awareness on the importance of a micro-level analysis. According to Schindler and
Bruck (2007), some studies have started to include the impact of conflict at the
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household level instead of solely relying on national level data. These studies employ
the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) to measure the impacts of conflict on the
human, physical financial, natural, and social capitals at multiple levels including,
national, local, and household levels.
One of the characteristic features of armed conflict is that it destroys the social
and economic foundations of individuals and households. The results can temporarily or
permanently halt the ability of households to maintain a sustainable livelihood and meet
their basic needs. According to the SLA framework, people’s capacity to generate and
maintain their means of living depends on drawing on a range of core assets called
capitals. These assets serve as the building blocks of people’s livelihoods. There are five
types of assets that all together enable people to pursue sustainable livelihoods. These
are human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals. The extent of access to these
capitals is strongly influenced by the amount of control, or lack thereof, that people have
over their surroundings. Armed conflict represents one of the factors that hamper the full
utilization of livelihood capitals and push people into poverty (Kollmair & Gamper,
2002).
At the grassroots level, human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, and
capabilities possessed by members of a household for pursuing their livelihood
activities. Conflict destroys the human capital of a household directly and indirectly.
According to Orero, Heime, Cuttler, and Mohaupt (2007), conflict can impact on the
human capital of households by causing death, forced migration, physical and mental
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disabilities, declines in health and nutrition status, and reducing education opportunities.
These factors constrain the short-term and the long-term capacities of households to earn
income and can drive them into poverty. In addition to this, conflict weakens the
financial capital of households by disrupting production activities, diminishing credits
and savings, and causing market failures. Moreover, conflict wipes out the physical
capital of households by destroying assets and production inputs. During armed
conflicts, a large number of physical assets are destroyed, seized, or abandoned. The loss
of such capital limits the productivity of households and signals a significant loss of
welfare. In addition to these effects, conflict entails a breakdown in natural resource
management and customary rights which results in the mismanagement and depletion of
natural capital in conflict affected areas. The other consequence of conflict is the effect
on social capital through disrupting family networks and relationships of trust and
cutting off access to wider institutions of society (Orero, et.al, 2007).
The processes of violence impact the economic status of households through the
direct and indirect human, physical, social, political, and cultural transformations they
entail. Some of the direct effects of conflict include changes in household composition
and income due to death, physical and psychological injuries, and conscription into the
military. Another direct effect of conflict includes changes in the household economic
status due to the destruction of assets and livelihoods and the effects caused by forced
displacement and migration. The indirect effects of conflict are reflected at the local
level or at the national level. Local indirect effects include changes in households’
access to local resources, employment, credit and insurance markets, social relations and
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networks, and other institutions. At the national level, the indirect effects of conflict
consist of a decline in economic growth which can impact household welfare
(Justino, 2008).
The Closing Gap between Peace and Development
The essence of studying the bidirectional relationship between poverty and
conflict suggests the need for a comprehensive approach that addresses the two
variables. According to Hillyard et al. (2005), the outcome of studying the two
dimensions of the poverty-conflict relationship is helpful in devising policies and actions
that simultaneously reduce poverty and promote peace. This means integrating
peacebuilding and conflict resolution with anti-poverty strategies and those international
programs ostensibly concerned with reconstruction. This represents a new interface of
research and practice in the fields of poverty and conflict (Hillyard et al. 2008).
The Horn of Africa has long suffered from the effects of widespread poverty and
protracted conflicts. There are multiple causes of conflict in the region one of which is
the unfair distribution of resources which results in the social and economic exclusion of
certain groups of society. This often entails in disparities through the lack of
infrastructure, social services, and security between different regions of a country.
Equitable development plays a positive role in conflict prevention by addressing the
long-term structural causes of conflict, such as poverty, injustice, and poor governance.
At the same time, peace and security are fundamental to poverty reduction and
sustainable development in the Horn of Africa. Given the prevalence and the high risk of
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poverty and conflict in the region and the clear link between the two, it requires a
holistic approach that simultaneously addresses both problems (Eteffa, 2005).
At the turn of this century, world leaders of the North and South met at the 2000
UN Millennium Summit and made a commitment to meet the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). One of the ambitious goals set at the time was to reduce poverty and
human deprivation by half in the year 2015. According to Penh (2009), despite the
progress made by China and India in the past decade, poverty has remained a significant
challenge in conflict-affected countries where nearly one-third of the world poor lives.
The virtual challenge of the poverty-conflict cycle has stimulated a new discussion and
partnership among the poverty reduction and conflict resolution communities. While
significant intellectual and practical contributions have been made in the fields of
poverty and conflict over decades, knowledge and practice in the convergence of these
two fields is still new and evolving (Penh, 2009).
The recognition of the mutual relationship between poverty and conflict has also
brought the realization of the causal interrelatedness between peace and development.
Although conflicts tend to reverse development, in many ways, the lack of socioeconomic development itself constitutes a powerful source of grievance which under
some circumstances can precipitate violent conflict. It is from this point that various
international and multilateral agencies have started to address peace and development in
a more holistic and integrated manner. For instance the Security Council, one of the
principal organs of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace
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and security, has progressively been integrating development with peacekeeping and
peacebuilding. It has extended its focus by addressing the immediate reconstruction
needs and the long term development and resolution of the structural causes of conflict.
In addition to this, other UN bodies that traditionally focus on socio-economic
development such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) are increasingly getting involved in
crisis prevention and conflict resolution thus integrating, peace and development issues
into their missions (Ocampo, 2004).
With the increasing knowledge on the two-way relationship between poverty and
conflict, the debates on peacebuilding and development are also moving closer together.
There is now a greater understanding of the shared objectives of sustainable
development and sustainable peace. In conflict prevention, the balance has shifted from
exclusive military response to more structural approaches that focus on the long-term
aspect of preventing a civil war. In development cooperation, increased attention is
being paid to the political conditions for development and the need to focus on the
causes rather than the appearances of poverty. Conflict resolution is also becoming an
integral part of the quest to reduce poverty and attain sustainable development.
Moreover, development agencies are recognizing the need to work in and on conflicts
rather than around them. More focus is being directed towards peacebuilding, which
reflects a step toward a long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term
concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts (Verstegen, 2001).
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Lederach (1997) also highlights a similar argument by underscoring the
importance of the link between peace and development. For Lederach, both peace and
development endeavors must be connected to a longterm goal that sustainably transform
a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of
self-sufficiency and well-being. They should lead to a proactive process that is capable
of regenerating a "spiral of peace and development instead of a spiral of violence and
destruction" (p.75).
Summary
In recent years, the poverty-conflict nexus has often played out along the greedgrievance debate, which presents two models to explain violence under conditions of
poverty. Popular among political economists, the greed model was developed based on
the influential work of Collier and Hoeffler (2001). It argues that civil war ignites as a
result of the predatory aspirations of rebels who want to grasp wealth through the
extortion and looting of primary commodities like oil and diamonds. Furthermore, the
lack of economic opportunities under poverty makes the cost of joining rebel groups
lower for the poor. On the other side of the debate, social psychologists have developed
their hypothesis, the grievance model. It is mostly based on the work of Gurr (1970)
who employs the notion of “relative deprivation” as the micro-foundation of collective
violence. When members of a collective group perceive deprivation in comparison to
another group or when there is a disparity between their aspirations and capabilities, it
can lead to frustration and aggression.
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The causal interaction between poverty and conflict is bi-directional. The
impoverishment of any social group creates a ripe condition for conflict and the
destructive and depressing impacts of conflict are factors that in turn perpetuate poverty
The connection is two-way, but it is not a linear relationship where one is the automatic
result of the other. The significance of studying the two-way linkage between poverty
and conflict lies in strengthening the partnership between peace and development; doing
so helps to converge the communities of conflict resolution and development for a
common purpose.
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6. Analysis
From Poverty to Conflict: Region 5
A 2008 baseline study of violent conflicts in Ethiopia identifies the main causes of
domestic conflicts as controversies over ethnic identity and religion, disagreements over
border and administrative arrangements, population dynamics, mineral extraction
activities, and discriminatory caste-like culture. In spite of its contribution in pointing
out the important elements of conflict in Ethiopia, the study failed to recognize poverty
as a major factor in any of Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts (African Rally for Peace and
Development [ARPD], 2008).
The above conclusion is common among many studies of intrastate conflicts in
Ethiopia. Assefa (1996) asserts that most of the wars waged in the Horn of Africa during
the past six decades have been described in terms of ethnic conflict, both by the
adversaries themselves and by external analysts. The majority of modern day conflicts in
Ethiopia have been presented as inter-ethnic rivalry for cultural autonomy and self-rule.
The reason for this, according to Stewart (2009), is that most conflicts are classified
based on their organizing identity, irrespective of the true underlying motive (p.5).
Therefore, we often focus on the basis of how people are mobilized instead of the socioeconomic and political causes of such mobilization. This is also true of Region 5 where
past and present organized conflicts are simply portrayed as ethnic strife between the
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“Amhara” or “Tigre” 16 ethnic dominated central governments of Ethiopia and ethnic
Somalis in Region 5.
On the contrary, the identification of Region 5 inhabitants as ethnic Somalis or as
members of the majority Ogadeen clan does not automatically translate into collective
violence. As Gross Stein (1996) argues, social identity and differentiation do not
inevitably lead to conflict. If they did, conflict would occur at all times under all
conditions. Boix & Stokes (2007) also argue, “this is not to deny that ethnicity plays a
part in conflict, but that it is insufficient to look at the presence of groups (ethnic,
religious, sectarian, etc.) to explain the onset of conflict” (p.420). For Boix and Stokes,
the salience of ethnic identities itself may be the outcome of a conflict rather than its
cause.
The single focus on ethnicity as the underlying source of armed conflicts has
often ignored the role of poverty in triggering and sustaining conflicts in Region 5. This
has led to poverty being treated as a side issue with no significant link to violence. As
will be seen in the next sections, poverty plays a crucial role in igniting and maintaining
the civil war in Region 5.

16

The Amhara and Tigre are the major ethnic groups accounting for 30.1 percent and
6.2 percent of the national population respectively (CIA, 2010). In many discourses, the
Amharas are believed to have dominated the political scene of the country since the
middle ages, until replaced by the Tigres in 1991. Rebel groups like the ONLF (2009)
argue that “past Amhara and present Tigre” domination is one of the leading causes of
long-term instability in the country. Such views have been contested by scholars like
Assefa (1996) who questions if “Amhara domination” is a code word that disguises
other social grievances or if it signifies supremacy of one population over another.
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Greed or Grievance?
In recent years, the poverty-conflict nexus has often played out along the greedgrievance debate, which presents two models to explain violence under conditions of
poverty. According to these two theories, the impetus to rebel can be related to either
economic or socio-political factors. What can we label the civil war in Region 5? Is it
greed based or a grievance driven conflict? This question can be answered by analyzing
the region’s socio-economic profile and identifying the conflict-motivating factors for
rebel leaders and their followers.
According to Dzurilla (2010), the greed driven theory of civil war argues that
poverty and the lack of economic opportunities drive insurgencies into action. Rebels
use a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the economic incentives of waging war
outweigh its relative costs. Moreover, an economy highly dependent on exporting
primary products such as diamonds or oil is at a greater risk of civil war. This is because
such commodities are easily looted by insurgencies for buying weapons and ammunition
and paying off their fighters. Region 5 does not extract or export non-renewable
resources like oil or diamonds. According to Devreux (2006), a crucial part of the
region’s economy relies on pastoralism, which mainly involves exporting livestock to
neighboring countries. It is true that in recent times the region has attracted foreign oil
companies from China, Sweden, Canada, United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia, which
have signed exploration deals with the Ethiopian government. According to Salopek
(2007) of the Chicago Tribune, the real prize is not the potential crude oil but the
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estimated 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the region. Although there is a huge
potential of future production, there has not been any real extraction of oil or natural gas
in the region.
The ONLF has on numerous occasions warned foreign companies to halt their
operations in Region 5.17 Despite its strong opposition to oil exploration activities in the
region, the ONLF does not draw its support through the prospect of looting natural
resources or demanding royalties from the oil companies. Its fighters are neither paid
soldiers nor are recruited on the promise of any material or monetary compensations.
The operational finance of the group is also not associated with the extraction and
extortion of natural resources. 18 The region is endowed with untapped resources of
natural gas and oil, but it is unrealistic to say that the motive behind the civil war is
about making profit from an undeveloped resource. Nevertheless, the presence of oil
companies can certainly complicate the dynamic of the conflict in the region.

17

The ONLF accuses these oil companies for collaborating with the Ethiopian
government and wants to discourage their investment in the region. In April, 2007, the
ONLF raided a Chinese run oil exploration project that left 74 people dead including 9
Chinese workers (ibid).
18
According to HRW (2008), the ONLF is a grassroots social and political movement
that consists of a rural-based guerrilla force. Its fighters regularly interact with civilians
and obtain food and water from a network of civilian supporters in the towns and
villages. Despite the attempts by the Ethiopian government to label the ONLF as a
terrorist group, the U.S and the European Union (EU) didn’t enlist the ONLF as terrorist
organization by the end of 2010.
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Therefore the basic idea that greed is the main factor in the region’s civil war is
simply misleading. Below are some of the factors that support this argument:
1.

The economy of the region relies on the export of livestock to neighboring
countries. The region doesn’t produce or export non-renewable natural resources
that serve as a potential loot for rebel insurgencies. Proponents of the greed
theory focus on the economic dimension of armed conflicts and argue that rebels
finance their operation through the exploitation of natural resources. On the
contrary, the ONLF is not involved in resource capture as part of funding or
running its operation. The civil war in the region can’t be categorized as a
resource war.

2.

The ONLF doesn’t have a commercial agenda in its fight against the
government.

3.

The ONLF doesn’t promise its fighters financial or material incentives upon
enlisting.

4.

One of the characteristics of greed-based civil wars is the emergence of war
economies, which is made possible by the climate of impunity and lawlessness
that civil war helps to create. In this type of economies, civilians participate in
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unregulated activities such as mining, smuggling, or growing illicit crops. This is
not the characteristic of the civil war in Region 5.19
5.

The greed theory contends that the lack of economic opportunities in povertystricken societies makes the opportunity cost of joining rebels low. Hence the
decision to enlist in a rebel group is based on a simple rational choice that
measures the economic cost and benefit of violence. Compared to a civilian life,
an ONLF fighter often experiences a very hard life in an inhospitable
environment with minimal access to the basic necessities of life. Even by
Rational Choice Theory (RCT), which is the corner stone of the greed rebellion
theory, it is difficult to suggest that the personal benefits associated with joining
the rebel group outweigh the relative costs of a civilian life.
The Role of Collective Grievance in the Civil War
Both the greed and grievance theories concur that poverty is an important

predisposing condition for violence, but they still differ in their approach on the actual
conflict driving factors. Although the greed model can be employed in several contexts,
its applicability to the civil war in Region 5 remains very limited. On the other hand, the
grievance theory offers a more practical approach to the context of Region 5. The
grievance model posits that many of today’s conflicts emanate from and are fought out
in frontier regions that have historically suffered from marginalization, limited voice,
19

The cross-border import and export trade between Region 5 and neighboring Somalia
is largely considered as a contraband transaction by the government. On the contrary,
this trade predates the current conflict and is not the direct result of the civil war.
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and hard-core poverty (Goodhand, 2001). The relative deprivation of social groups
produce collective grievance that can be exploited by politicians and rebel groups to
generate conflicts.
According to the grievance theory, the underlying circumstances or the
socioeconomic and political conditions that negatively differentiate ethnic Somalis as a
cultural or regional unit from other similar groups form an important tangent of the five
decades civil conflict in Region 5. Here, the socio-economic and political
marginalization of the people is framed through their cultural identity. In simple terms,
the coupling of the Somali cultural identity and the relative deprivation perceived by
members of this same cultural group explains the root source of the violent civil conflict
in the region. Lunn (2008) supports this argument by stating that one of the factors that
exacerbate the likelihood of armed conflict in the region is the relative deprivation of its
people in terms of access to social, economic, and political resources.
Historical Deprivation of Ethnic-Somalis in Modern Ethiopia
For the greater part of its modern history, Region 5 has been one of the most
deprived and insecure regions of Ethiopia. Armed conflict and poverty are constant
sources of vulnerability for the people of the region. Living in one of the most fragile
ecosystems of the world, pastoralists of the region are not only exposed to various
natural and man-made disasters, but they also possess limited capacity to cope with the
damaging losses (Markakis, 2004).The introduction of a modern state system, brought
through colonialism and the Ethiopian state expansion at the end of the nineteenth
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century, introduced catastrophic challenges to Somali pastoralists. The restriction on
movement, trade regulation, and territorial demarcation imposed by the modern state
administrations impaired the indigenous survival mechanisms of pastoralists and further
pushing them into poverty. By the mid- twentieth century, Lockyer (2006) argues that
there was no sign of development in the region. It was a flat and dry pastoral land that
had remained virtually void of any form of economic, infrastructural, or social
development.
Setting Region 5 in the national context shows that it is one of the most
impoverished regional states of Ethiopia. A study by Deressa et al (2008), concluded
that the region is at the lowest level of regional development in Ethiopia. The study also
revealed that the region had the lowest proportion of healthcare services, food markets,
primary and secondary schools, and access to modern farm supplies. Although livestock
ownership is the highest in the country, it is met with the lowest provision of veterinary
services nationwide.
The Central Emergency Response Fund [CERF] (2010) identifies Region 5 as
one of the least developed regions of Ethiopia in terms of access to essential services
and food security. The area is also comparatively prone to outbreaks of measles,
meningitis, and viral hemorrhagic fevers due to lack of health care services. Malnutrition
accounts for eight percent of all mortalities while deaths during childbirths constitute
twenty-three percent of all mortalities in the region.
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One of the striking features of Region 5 is the extreme lack of social services
available to its people. These services are often under-resourced and unevenly
distributed. Where there are schools and health clinics, there are often no teachers,
books, doctors, or medical supplies. This stands against the rising expectations of how
people can live and what they are entitled to receive from the region. The presence of
unfulfilled needs means a gap between social expectations and reality that leads to social
frustration and increases the possibility of armed conflict (CHF, 2006).
Many studies support the notion that Region 5 is a relatively underdeveloped part
of Ethiopia. A report on the distribution of manufacturing industries by regional states
points out that Region 5 accounts for only 0.52 percent of the total number of large and
medium scale industries in the country. This number can be compared with Region 1
and Region 3 which comprise of 12.5 and 8.7 percents respectively, for the same
category of manufacturing industries (CSA, 2009). Regional inequalities are not only
limited to the manufacturing sector. The 2004 Welfare Monitoring Survey of Ethiopia
marked Region 5 for its lowest level of primary school enrollment (38 percent) in the
country. A stark disparity is also noted in immunization coverage for DPT,20 BCG,21 and
Measles which stands at 17 percent for Region 5. This can be compared with 87 percent
for Region 1 and 74 percent for the national average.22 Access to information which is

20

Diptheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine
Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (Tuberculosis)
22
The data refers to children under the age of 5.
21
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measured by household ownership of radio sets23 once again finds its lowest proportion
in Region 5. Only 48.3 percent of households in the region own radio sets. The
percentage shows significant increase for other regional states of Ethiopia (69.2 percent
for Region 4 and 85 percent for Region 14) (CSA, 2004).
All the above indicators point to the unfair share of material and non-material
resources between Region 5 and other regions of Ethiopia. It is one of the main reasons
that have placed the region in a chronic state of poverty. It is also a major source of
social grievance in the region that has mobilized citizens to rebel against the
government. The complexity of such inequalities arises from the fact that regional states
in Ethiopia are also ethnically carved territories. Therefore, the socio-economic
inequality between regions also represents inequality along identity lines. Brown (2005)
argues that the broad coincidence of cultural or ethnic differences with severe economic,
political, or social inequalities can be a significant cause of violent conflicts. Such
inequalities, also termed as horizontal inequalities, are potent sources of armed conflict
in Region 5.
From a historic perspective, Region 5 has been one Ethiopian frontier where the
introduction of modern statehood has minimally impacted service delivery and
institutional capacity (Hagmann & Kahlif, 2006). The state of socioeconomic welfare of
the region has been low not only in the absolute sense but also relative to the national
average. Ostby (2006) underlines that those societies with high regional inequalities
23

Radio is the major source of information for the majority of the population in
Ethiopia.
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carry a higher risk of civil war than societies without such inequalities. Ostby adds that
members of the disadvantaged group or region are likely to feel frustration and
antagonism especially when their deprivation is the result of structural exploitation and
discrimination. The national imbalance or the inter-regional inequality in socioeconomic welfare between Region 5 and other parts of Ethiopia is the major source of
social frustration and conflict in the region. As Lederach (1997) posited, what is often
understood as “content” or “substance” of a conflict is this structural dimension which
highlights the underlying causes of conflict (p.83).
Region 5 fares worse than most other regions of Ethiopia across multiple socioeconomic indicators (see table 2). It has remained a periphery state throughout most of
its modern history, causing frustration and ill-will of its people towards the government
(Hagmann, 2007). According to Nicol, Arsano, & Raisin (2000), the legacy of tension
between the central state and the periphery coupled with state authority over the control
of resources meant that the state often became the focus of conflict. This was especially
true where resource allocation was perceived to be relatively uneven. However, the shift
from grievances of deprivation and inequality to collective violence did not occur
without the role played by rebel movements and other political actors.

Poverty and Conflict

73

Table 2
Poverty Indicators: Region 5 Versus the National Average (2005)
Poverty Indicator

Region
5

National
Average

Percentage of population with no formal education
Male 82

52

89

67

7.4

46.3

9.1

38.9

Percentage of population with healthcare facility located more
than a mile away

82.7

53.3

Percentage of children age 12-23 months who received BCG,
DPT , Polio and Measles vaccines

8.1

67.2

Percentage of children under 5 years classified as malnourished
according to anthropometric indices ( height for age, weigh for
height and age)

30.3

17.8

Percentage of population aged 15-49 with comprehensive
knowledge about HIV-AIDS

50

93.3

Prevalence of Anemia in children aged 6-59 months

85.6

50.4

Female
Percentage of women with access to antenatal care
Percentage of women who were protected against neonatal
Tetanus through Tetanus toxoid injection

Note: Ethiopia, Demographic and Health Survey: 2005 by CSA. Copyright 2006 by
Central Statistics Agency. Public Data.
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The Role of Rebel Groups in Mobilizing for Organized Conflict
During the past five decades, organized conflicts in Region 5 have played out as
an interconnected web of interstate and intrastate conflicts involving both state and nonstate actors. Armed rebel groups like the OLF, WSLF, and ONLF have carried out their
missions as grassroots movements by recruiting from the historically marginalized
population of Region 5. Although the support from the neighboring state of Somalia was
significant during the high time of the Cold War, Africa Watch Report [AWR] (1991)
argues that it was the frustrated and alienated people of Region 5 who formed the major
fighting force of armed opposition movements. These groups have effectively rallied the
region’s population against successive Ethiopian governments in response to the
prevailing and anticipated horizontal inequalities. They have harnessed the social
frustration resulting from these inequalities to mobilize mass support around their cause.
As stated in the previous paragraphs, Region 5 is one of the most underserved
regions of Ethiopia. The various socio-economic data (CSA, 2004, 2009) testify the
impoverishment and the relative deprivation of the region. The social frustration and
resentment that generates from these conditions have helped the ONLF and other rebel
groups to initiate grassroots insurgencies at various times. Holzer (2010) argues that the
ONLF has been able to build on the local grievances of four million ethnic Somalis in
Ethiopia’s most underdeveloped territory. In the same manner, Mohamoud (2009) points
out that the economic misery and the lack of basic government services are some of the
systemic problems that give the ONLF its needed recruits. Mohamoud also confirms that
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there is a genuine anger and feeling of hopelessness among the region’s citizens
concerning their economic well-being.
According to Stewart and Brown (2007), rebel groups need genuine social,
economic, or political grievances for mass mobilization. In addition to this, a common
history, language, culture, or religion is generally required to generate felt identities
powerful enough to mobilize people for conflict. The Somali cultural identity has
inevitably provided the foundation for mobilizing its members for political action. It has
equipped rebel groups with the basis for gathering mass support. Menzel (2006) points
out that the feeling of deprivation can be harnessed and directed towards the
strengthening of the group identity and used to manifest resistance and change. During
the last fifty years, rebel groups in Region 5 have created a structural linkage between
poverty of the region and the social identity of its people. In simple words, rebel groups
have framed the poverty and exclusion of the region through the cultural (ethnic)
identity of its people. This has helped in mobilizing civilians for collective violence.
Armed dissident movements have also successfully politicized the Somali ethnic
identity by revising its shared history and creating a new form of group consciousness.
One of the ways this was carried out was by trying to build a historic continuity of the
Somali and Ethiopian hostility dating back to the sixteenth century religious
wars between the Adal Sultanate24 and the Ethiopian Christian Empire (Hagmann,

24

The Adal Sultanate was a medieval multi-ethnic Muslim kingdom located in the Horn
of Africa. It included part of what is today Region 5, Region 2 (Afar), Somaliland, and
Djibouti.
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2007). Rebels have frequently activated shared historical memories of victimization and
humiliation for the collective group. Volkan (1998) identifies such collective memories
as “chosen trauma.” It is an effective way of bringing a social group together for
common action including violence. While these efforts have brought the social cohesion
needed for political mobilization, they have also transformed the Somali cultural identity
into a political identity.
Summary
For the greater part of its modern history, Region 5 has been one of the poorest
and the most marginalized regions of Ethiopia. The socio-economic development in the
region reflects a stark difference when compared to other regions of Ethiopia. The
relative impoverishment of the region is a strong source of grievance among its people.
Here, the inhabitants perceive the region’s deprivation at the level of their collective
identity. Politicians and rebel groups have been able to capitalize this shared sense of
grievance to mobilize people for violence.
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From Conflict to Poverty: Region 5
One of the concepts that study the impact of conflict on poverty is the
Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA). According to this framework, a livelihood is
sustainable if it can maintain its capabilities and assets (human, economic, physical,
natural, and social capitals) for now and future generations to come. What people can do
and how this results in a sustainable outcome like food security can be subjected to
various external influences, one of which is armed conflict. Conflict can deplete and
distort the human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of a nation at multiple
layers, including the household, local, and national levels (FAO, 2010).
Conflict impacts on poverty through a range of direct and indirect factors. Some
of the direct costs of conflict include the toll on human lives, the physical injury and
psychological trauma incurred on survivors, the mass displacement of civilians, and the
destruction of productive assets and physical infrastructures. The indirect consequences
of conflict refer to the effects on the survival and welfare of people due to collapsing
health care systems, low school enrollments, food insecurity, social disorder, and
diversion of resources from development programs to violence. The combined direct and
indirect repercussions of conflict can destroy and reduce the human, physical, economic,
social, and natural capitals of a nation at various levels.
Region 5 is one of the most conflict ridden and poverty stricken provinces of
Ethiopia. Decades of war and violent conflict has diminished the region’s human,
physical, economic, social, and natural capitals and impoverished its inhabitants. The

Poverty and Conflict

78

region has been devoid of meaningful socio-economic development for the entire part of
its modern history. It remains an underserved region with the lowest level of human
development in the country. The region’s literacy rate of 22 percent for males and only
9.8 percent among females is an indicator of its low level of human development (CSA,
2006). Derressa et al (2008) also point out that Region 5 has the lowest literacy rate, the
least access to health care services, and the lowest life expectancy nationwide. For years,
the persistence of hunger and malnutrition has affected millions in the region. In the last
decade alone, a million people a year (25 percent of the total population) were food aid
beneficiaries (ibid).
According to a United Nation’s [UN] (2007) report, the poor development of
Region 5 must be seen against the backdrop of the long-standing civil war between the
Ethiopian government and rebels in the region. On the other hand, it is worth noting that
the poverty in the region cannot be tied to a single conflict episode but to the sum impact
of the various conflicts that have occurred over the centuries. Accounting for each
conflict of the past is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is important to
acknowledge that most of the violent conflicts fought in the region possessed two
important features that have contributed to the poverty in the region. These are:
1.

Armed conflicts in the region have often deliberately targeted the socioeconomic base of households. The destruction of human, physical, economic, social,
and natural capitals, which are essential for the survival of households, has created
widespread poverty in the region.
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Pastoralists in Region 5 inhabit one of the most barren ecosystems in the Horn of
Africa. For centuries, pastoralists have employed effective and efficient coping
strategies that have sustained them in such an environment. Violent conflicts
often block the implementation of these adaptive strategies and reduce the
effective utilization of livelihood capitals, which in turn leads to poverty.
The Effects of Armed Conflicts in Region 5 (1960-2010)
In the last five decades, several armed conflicts have taken place in Region 5 in

the form of interstate wars and intrastate conflicts. These conflicts have played
prominent role in undermining household capitals and pushing them into poverty. As
will be seen in the next section, the military strategies adopted by successive Ethiopian
regimes (1960-2010) were also crucial in impoverishing the region. The following are
some of the effects that armed conflicts have had on the region.
The Human Cost of Conflict
Given the great number of conflicts that took place in the region, there is no
exact figure on the human costs of conflict. On the other hand, it is safe to say that
violence has persistently preyed upon the human capital of the region by killing,
disabling, assaulting, and displacing civilians. Conflict has also impeded the
development of human capital by disrupting the education, health, and food distribution
systems of the region.
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Death and Physical and Psychological Injuries
In Region 5, the human casualty of armed conflicts has not been limited to
combatants. Civilians have often been victims of indiscriminate killings during
insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. However, civilian causality is not only the
outcome of direct violence. According to Zwi & Macrae (1994), civilians are threatened
not only by bombs and bullets but by the massive social and economic dislocation
caused by war. The breakdown or the absence of health and social services in the region,
which is partly caused by conflict, also claims many lives. Devreux (2006) states that the
poor quality and limited accessibility to health services in the region is demonstrated by
the high numbers of preventable deaths due to untreated illness, inadequate
immunization coverage, malnutrition and hunger-related diseases, and deaths of mothers
and infants during childbirth. In addition to the loss of lives, armed conflict in the region
has resulted in mental and physical disablement of civilians.25
Mass Displacement of Civilians
One of the defining features of organized conflicts in the region is the
involuntary displacement of civilians within and across borders that create internally
displaced persons (IDP) and refugees. When people are uprooted from their habitual
residence, they leave behind the livelihood capitals they have accumulated over time.

25

According to Marshall (2006), far more problematic than conflict-related deaths is the
much larger numbers of survivors who are physically and psychologically affected by
violence.
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According to Cernea (2004), forced displacement can cause impoverishment among the
displaced by bringing about landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization,
food insecurity, increased morbidity, and community breakdown. In addition to these,
migration disrupts education, health care, and other social services.
In the last few decades, thousands of civilians in Region 5 have fled their homes
in fear of violence and persecution. According to Tareke (2002), successive Ethiopian
governments have forcefully and purposefully uprooted rural inhabitants to isolate
insurgents (WSLF and ONLF) and deprive them of their local support. To this effect, the
forceful relocation of civilians has been used as a military strategy during the decades
old civil war. A case in point is the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Ethiopian
government in 1979 in an attempt to eradicate the WSLF. One aspect of this strategy
was to depopulate the conflict zone. This resulted in half a million people crossing into
neighboring Somalia as refugees while hundreds of thousands were displaced internally
(AWR, 1991). According to Mohamoud Abdi (2007), eighty percent of the region’s
population was in one way or another affected by this displacement. A similar
counterinsurgency method was employed by the successor Ethiopian government in
2007. This time, the operation aimed at weakening ONLF’s (breakaway rebel group
from WSLF) support base and confining its area of operation. The government
depopulated small villages and pastoralist settlements in conflict zones by ordering
villagers and nomads to move to designated towns. Many of the villages and settlements
were later burned to prevent reentry by the local inhabitant (HRW, 2008a)
(See Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Satellite Images of the Village of Lassoole, Region 5 Before and After
Burning
Note: Ogaden War Crimes in Ethiopia (HRW, 2008b)
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Sexual Violence
Sexual violence constitutes not just a byproduct of conflict but a military tactic
implemented to instigate terror and punish civilians in conflict zones. According to
Ogaden Human Rights Commission [OHRC] (2006), there were 1,870 reported cases of
rape and child molestation in Region 5 between the years 1992-2005. The data is not
reflective of the full extent of horror in the region. Most rape victims do not report such
crimes to local authorities as they risk reprisal by the perpetrators and for fear of being
ostracized by their own community. HRW (2008a) reported that sexual violence has
become a widespread crime that is implemented by government forces with complete
impunity. The rape of female detainees in military custody regularly occurs and often
involves senior military officials, highlighting the systematic aspect of the trend.
Sexual violence is one of the causes of poverty in conflict zones. The physical
and psychological damages incurred on the victim account for loss of human capital.
According to the British Medical Journal, the effects of rape and sexual torture on
survivors are economically, physically, psychologically, and culturally devastating.
Survivors can be left with economic deprivation and sexually transmitted diseases
(Kivlahan & Ewingman, 2010). In addition to this, sexual violence perpetuates the
feminization of poverty. Devereux (2006) points out that the effects of gender-based
risks and vulnerabilities in the region are already visible in higher mortality rate and
lower life expectancy of females as compared to males. When sexual violence is added
on top of these gender based disparities, it pushes more females into poverty.
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The Killing and Confiscation of Livestock
In Region 5, where 85.5 percent of the active population is engaged in either
pastoralism or agro-pastoralism, livestock forms an integral part of the livelihood system
for many households (Cooperazione Internazionale [COOPI], 2003). It represents an
important economic capital that can either be used as a saving or can be liquidated into
cash. Livestock is also a physical capital that produces its own output, milk, for the
market. No less important, livestock forms a key part of the pastoralist’s cultural life and
social support system which makes it a prime social capital. In the last five decades, this
versatile asset of pastoralists has come under attack from successive Ethiopian regimes.
This represents not just an assault on the economic or physical capital of pastoralists but
also an attack on the pastoralist way of life.
Livestock forms a vital part of pastoralist livelihood and culture and its
decimation or expropriation can permanently impoverish its dependents. The
confiscation of livestock is not a new phenomenon in the region. Laitin & Samatar
(1987) point out that between 1890 and 1897, the Ethiopian Empire under King Menilik
II consented to a number of livestock raids in the region. These raids have dispossessed
pastoralists more than 100,000 cattle, 200,000 camels, and 600,000 sheep and goats
(P.55). According to Markakis (2004), the confiscation of livestock was one of the
methods applied by the Empire to secure a modicum of control over pastoralists.
Since the beginning of the civil war in 1960, the confiscation and killing of
livestock has taken a different form. It has become an important part of the
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government’s military strategy to plunder and punish civilians for their assumed ties
with insurgents.26 According to AWR (1991), 200,000 head of livestock was seized by
the Ethiopian military in 1971 and 1972 alone. This method has continued in the twentyfirst century. The Integrated Regional Information Network [IRIN] (2001) reported on
the dire economic consequences of livestock confiscation in the region. The Guardian
(2007) also reported on how the confiscation and destruction of livestock by government
forces contributes to humanitarian crisis in the region.
Trade Blockade
One of the sectors that have been disrupted with the on-going conflicts in the
region is commercial trade. In the last five decades, trade activities in the region have
suffered from the destructive and depressing effects of armed conflicts. This has created
a shortfall in household income (economic capital) due to loss of employment and
market failures.
Livestock is a major physical capital owned by the majority of households in
Region 5. It is also the major source of income in the region. Most of the livestock trade
in the region takes place in the form of informal cross-border transaction between
pastoralists and traders. Livestock is exported to neighboring Somalia, Kenya, and
Djibouti where it is re-exported to the Middle-East. The imports of the region, which

26

Although the government is implicated in many of the civilian killings and physical
destruction in the last five decades, rebel insurgents also played a significant role in
destabilizing the region through indiscriminate killings, kidnappings, and planting
landmines that destroyed human lives and infrastructures.
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mostly include non-perishable food and consumer goods, are also imported unofficially
from neighboring states of Somalia and Djibouti. This form of informal cross-border
trade has been going on for centuries by using traditional trade routes that predate
present state boundaries. These customary routes have served as the lifeline of the region
by connecting it with different ports in Somalia and Djibouti (Devereux, 2006).
In the last five decades, these trade routes have been interrupted by different
forms of conflict in the region. According to Devereux (2006), the orientation of these
corridors is that certain clans control each route, and relations between clans along the
route determine the smooth flow of trade. Therefore, the import-export trade in the
region has always been susceptible to inter-clan conflicts. The other disruption to trade
is caused by the Ethiopian government which considers the cross-border trade as illegal.
Although the government has for a long time tried to regulate this trade, it has also
worked to enforce it as part of its military strategy. For instance in 2007, the government
blocked major trade routes in the region following the onset of its massive
counterinsurgency operation. According to a report by the UN (2007), this dramatically
reduced the flow of commercial goods and services including food into the region.
Similarly, the export of livestock, which is the main source of income in the region, was
significantly reduced. The results were devastating to the region. The same report
indicated that prices of food items increased by an average of 95 percent due to shortage
of supply while livestock prices fell by as much as 33 percent due to over-supply in the
market. This has placed a heavy blow to the economic capital of households through
reduced earnings and high inflation of basic commodities.
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Restriction on Mobility
One of the setbacks of the long civil war in the region is the restriction on the
movement of civilians. This has often been decreed by the Ethiopian government to
isolate insurgent groups and cut them off from their support base (ibid). On the other
hand, this strategy has undermined the economic activities of pastoralists which greatly
depend on free movement. The environmental vulnerability of the region has always
required pastoralists to adopt a periodic mobility pattern in search of seasonally
distributed pastures and water points. Therefore, pastoralism is not just an economic
activity but also an indigenous coping strategy that helps maintain the balance between
pastoralists and their sparse natural environment. The limitation on mobility has greatly
compromised the adaptive capacity of pastoralists to their harsh environment. This has
in turn strained their productivity. It has also caused ecological damage by off-setting
the balance between pastoralists and their delicate environment.
Food as a Weapon
One of the effects of armed conflict in the region is the continuous inability of its
inhabitants to produce or procure sufficient food. The region has repeatedly experienced
famine in the last six decades. These famines have commonly been associated with the
dry weather pattern of the region. On the other hand, Kebbede (1991) argues that while
the adverse impact of the natural environment can’t be denied, famine susceptibility
cannot be explained by dry weather alone. The reasons also lie within the socioeconomic
and political factors like poverty and conflict that multiply the brute forces of nature.
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The food insecurity in the region is not only the end result of violence but also a
conscious instrument of warfare used by successive Ethiopian regimes. According to
Macrae and Zwi (1994), the use of food as a weapon involves attacks on the food
production and marketing systems, blocking the flow of commercial and relief grain to
deficit areas, and the deliberate provisioning or withholding of food. The Ethiopian
government has often targeted civilian food production as it is considered the major
source of food supply for the local insurgents. On many occasions, the government has
diverted or blocked food supplies in food shortage areas to prevent its possible outflow
to insurgents. These actions have played important role in directing starvation against
the people of Region 5.
According to ARW (1991), the government’s military strategy was instrumental
in creating the famine of 1973-75 which claimed around 55,000 lives in the region. The
same strategy also played a big role during the massive 1983-85 famine. In 2007, the
government deliberately blocked food supplies in major conflict zones as part of its
counterinsurgency operation. This created a short-term humanitarian crisis in the region.
Newsweek (2010) reported that in 2008, the government only distributed 12 percent of
the available food aid while diverting the remaining amount. At the time, two million
people were affected by the severe food shortage in region.
A Tear in the Social Fabric
According to Collier (1998), social capital is the glue that holds societies
together, which is essential for economic growth and well-being. Over the years,
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pastoralists in Region 5 have established traditional institutions that are crucial in
promoting cooperation and mitigating the effects of poverty. These institutions are broad
and cover areas of conflict resolution, natural resource management, restorative justice,
and transfer of resources. Orero et al (2007) argue that conflict can impact on social
capital by causing displacement, changing household composition, disrupting family
networks, breaking down relationships of trust, and closing off access to wider
institutions of society. In recent years, the pastoral society of Region 5 has witnessed an
institutional breakdown due to the effects of organized and communal conflicts (Gedi,
2006). The long-term effects of armed conflict have created a tear in the social fabric.
This has made it difficult to utilize social capital for collective benefit. The social
networks which served as a positive social capital for hundreds of years are now
disappearing.
The Macro-Level Impact of Armed Conflicts in Region 5
In the last fifty years, large scale conflicts fought in Region 5 and in other parts
of Ethiopia have caused substantial cost to the economy of the country. The destruction
of human and physical resources has reduced the level and growth of capital stock in the
country. Protracted conflicts have greatly undermined the overall capacity of the state in
the provision of public services. The persistent insecurity has halted domestic
investment and relocated capital abroad. According to Geda (2004), armed conflicts
have also distorted the composition of national spending by diverting scarce resources
away from non-military sectors like education and health care. For instance, the 1983
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Ethiopian state budget allocated twenty-five percent for defense spending while it set
aside four percent for healthcare and eleven percent for education. On top of its lion’s
share, the military had an outstanding debt of 1.1 billion dollars in 1982 (Wubeneh &
Abate, 1988). This diversion of expenditure has also diminished spending on economic
infrastructures, agriculture, transportation, and other public sectors.
Summary
In the last fifty years, armed conflict has played a critical role in shrinking the
human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals of households and reducing them
into poverty. Although poverty is an outcome of most armed conflicts, in Region 5, it is
also part of the warfare strategy used deliberately by government forces. Different
regimes have employed war techniques that have intentionally impoverished households
by destroying their socio-economic base and indigenous way of life. These strategies
were placed as a way of diminishing the support base of insurgents. They have however
created widespread poverty in the region.
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7. Conclusion
Region 5 is one of the most impoverished and insecure regions of Ethiopia. For
decades, the region has suffered from a multitude of armed conflicts involving state and
non-state actors. Region 5 is also is one of the most impoverished states of Ethiopia with
some of the lowest indicators of human development nationwide. The poverty and
conflict in the region are in a continuous relationship where one is the cause and effect
of the other. One of the challenges of human security in the region is found in this
mutually reinforcing relationship between conflict and poverty.
The underlying source of collective violence in the region is strongly linked to
the economic, political, and social deprivation faced by its inhabitants. Region 5 is one
of the relatively underdeveloped and poverty stricken regions of Ethiopia on several
socio-economic indicators. When poverty and inequality coincide with the social
identity of a group, they result in a strong sense of grievance which can mobilize the
group for violence. This is true of Region 5 where the systematic exclusion of its
population has created social frustrations that transform into organized conflicts. The
resulting conflict has in turn exacerbated poverty in the region through the direct and
indirect loss of human, physical, economic, social, and natural capitals. This povertyconflict cycle has been an on-going trend in the region for the last five decades.
While the subject on the two-way relationship between poverty and conflict is
certainly new, it still represents a growing area of study that is expanding the joint
ventures of peace and development. It is also creating an interface of knowledge and

Poverty and Conflict

92

practice between the peacebuilding and development communities. Development is now
becoming an integral part of conflict resolution and conflict resolution itself is now a
prime component of development programs.
Although poverty and conflict in the region have often been appreciated in their
own respects, many in academic circles did not see them as two sides of the same coin.
Any approach of attaining human security in the region requires working simultaneously
with the two variables. The main objective of this research paper was to analyze the twoway relationship between poverty and conflict in Region 5 and contribute to the pool of
knowledge that seeks to develop a comprehensive approach to sustainable peace and
development. While this research paper is certainly a jump start in a new path of
studying human security in the twenty-first century, its contribution remains minimal
considering the complexity and depth of poverty and conflict in the region.
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